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A COURT NOT EASY TO CLASSIFY
The New York Times
Thursday, June 29, 2000
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dean of Stanford Law School
You would think that in an election year,
the Supreme Court justices might cooperate
with popular efforts to label them liberal or
conservative, lining up the big decisions on a
political scorecard. After all, the next president
may get to appoint one or more new members
to the court -- three justices are over 70, four
have fought serious illnesses and some might
welcome the chance to retire if the new
president were likely to appoint a sympathetic
successor.
But in the rich and important term that they
finished yesterday, the justices defied any
simple political typecasting, proving once again
that the court does not simply follow the
election returns, and that court-packing is
harder than it looks.
To be sure, there are several areas -- such
as the separation of church and state and the
scope of federal power -- where the court did
divide rigidly into two camps, and in which
future outcomes do hang by one vote.
For instance, will the court uphold voucher
programs that give tax money to parochial
schools, deciding that they are not, as some
claim, an unconstitutional "establishment" of
religion in violation of the First Amendment? A
clue came in a 6-to-3 ruling yesterday holding
that the government may grant computers and
other teaching aids to religious schools. Four
justices -- Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia and
Anthony Kennedy -- indicated a likely
willingness to uphold voucher schemes,
reasoning in an opinion by Justice Thomas that
it is "bigotry" to exclude "pervasively sectarian
schools from otherwise permissible aid
,,
programs.
But these four justices do not yet have a
clear fifth vote for the constitutionality of
vouchers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor went
to great lengths in a separate, but concurring
opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, to
caution that the court must still review aid
programs carefully to make sure they do not
support too much religious indoctrination.
The power of Congress to enact broad civil
rights laws also hangs in a 5-to-4 balance.
Earlier this year, the court threw out both a
federal lawsuit by a young woman claiming
damages after date rape by football players at a
state university and a lawsuit by employees
claiming age discrimination by a state employer,
reasoning in each case that Congress had
overstepped its authority in allowing such suits.
Five members of the court -- Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and
Thomas -- have consistently voted for such
restrictions of federal power; four --Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer -- would
give more latitude to Congress. The presidential
election could tip this balance.
But in a wide range of other decisions this
term, the justices declined to march in neat
political lockstep. If the court had voted
according to the popular stereotypes of
"liberal" and "conservative" judges, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer, who were appointed by
President Clinton, would not have disagreed on
whether the Constitution's prohibition on
retroactive laws required the court to overturn
the conviction of a child molester.
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Nor would Justice Scalia, a "conservative,"
have had occasion on Monday to lecture the
more "liberal" Justice Breyer on the importance
of an undiminished right to trial by jury for a
defendant accused of a hate crime.
The fact that the justices do not vote along
simple ideological lines results in unexpected
coalitions. For instance, Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, all appointed by
Republican presidents, and Justice Ginsburg
struck down a law requiring television cable
companies either to completely scramble, or to
take off the air, sexually explicit broadcasts
during waking hours. The only other
Democratic appointee, Justice Breyer, joined
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Scalia in
arguing that the restrictions were proper.
And dissenting in another case, Justices
Scalia and Breyer agreed that the Constitution
allows a federal agent to squeeze bus
passengers' carry-on bags looking for drugs; the
other seven justices were convinced this was an
illegal search.
The court's judicial activism last term was
also bipartisan. It ruled two federal laws that
might be viewed as conservative to be
unconstitutional: one limiting smut on cable
television and the other giving police more
leeway to interrogate suspects without the
straitjacket of Miranda warnings. But it also
struck down federal laws against gender-
motivated violence and age discrimination by
the states -- both likely to be favored by liberal
constituencies.
Ruling on state laws, the court struck down
"conservative" measures that authorized
student-led prayers at public high school
football games, gave grandparents broad access
to their grandchildren over a parent's objection
and banned so-called partial-birth abortions.
But it also invalidated "liberal" state laws
forcing the Boy Scouts to admit a gay
scoutmaster and giving native Hawaiians
preferences in voting for officials in charge of
native Hawaiian affairs. And this week, it
invalidated the California primary system,
which allowed votes across party lines,
reasoning that a measure favored by political
moderates like Democratic Gov. Gray Davis
and Republican Representative Tom Campbell
in fact violated political parties' freedom of
association.
The court's influence over the allocation of
power and rights in our society is profound,
and its power well worth reckoning in the
coming election. The president holds sway over
not one but two branches of government -- the
executive and the judiciary. But this term's
decisions should make politicians wary of
simple ideological labels.
Copyright C 2000 The New York Times
Company
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THE NATION: SPLIT DECISIONS
The Court Rules, Amenca Changes
The New York Times
Sunday, July 2,2000
Linda Greenhouse
It was a Supreme Court term of surpassing
interest, rich in symbol and substance, a vivid
reminder of the court's power to scramble
settled expectations, put old questions to rest
and, ultimately, to have the last word.
The justices stood by some precedents and
repudiated others. They invalidated four federal
laws, continuing on the path of subjecting the
exercise of congressional authority to close and
skeptical scrutiny.
During the term that began last Oct. 4 and
ended June 28, the court decided only 73 cases,
the fewest number of any term since the early
1950's. Although small, the docket ranged over
almost the entire constitutional landscape. The
First Amendment alone, with its provisions
governing association, religion and free speech,
injected the justices into state electoral systems,
high school football games and sexually explicit
cable television programming.
In addition, some of the court's most
important rulings were statutory: the
invalidation of the Food and Drug
Administration's regulation of tobacco and a
decision keeping many medical malpractice
cases against health maintenance organizations
out of federal court.
The H.M.O. decision was unanimous, as
were more than a third of the court's rulings.
But the court was more sharply divided than
usual, with the middle ground often seeming to
disappear. Twenty cases were decided by 5 to 4
votes, a higher proportion than in most recent
years. A solid conservative bloc consisting of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas
hung together and prevailed in 13 of the 20.
The four more liberal justices -- John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer -- voted as a
group in the majority in only one 5-to-4 case,
the decision striking down Nebraska's abortion
law, where they were joined by Justice
O'Connor. The six remaining close cases were
scrambled: for example, in the case striking
down a federal regulation on sexually explicit
programming on cable television, Justice
Thomas, who often displays a libertarian bent
on free speech issues, and Justice Kennedy,
who almost always adopts the free speech
position, were in the majority to strike down
the regulation, while Justice Breyer, often
sympathetic to government interests in speech
cases, voted in dissent.
At the center of the court this term were
Justice O'Connor, who cast only five dissenting
votes; ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who cast eight;
and Justice Kennedy, who dissented nine times.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's position at the center
of the court is itself a measure of how
conservative the court has become; Associate
Justice Rehnquist had been the court's most
frequent lone dissenter when President Reagan
chose him 14 years ago to succeed Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger.
Now, for example, on criminal law, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's vote is a fair indicator of the
court's center of gravity. To his right, Justice
Scalia, who dissented 15 times this term, and
Justice Thomas, who dissented 12 times, were
the two dissenters from the chief justice's
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decision that reaffirmed the Miranda ruling. To
the chief justice's left, Justice Stevens dissented
28 times and Justice Ginsburg 23, on cases
ranging from equal protection to congressional
authority to prisoners' rights.
Yet the labels conservative and liberal do
not fully capture this court. "Which cases were
most visible to the public this year?" John G.
Roberts Jr., a Supreme Court practitioner and
and former deputy solicitor general during the
Bush administration, asked rhetorically the
other day. "Probably school prayer, abortion,
and Miranda, and the conservatives lost all
three," Mr. Roberts said. "The conventional
wisdom needs to be taken skeptically."
The key to this court's mysteries may lie in
examining where the justices commit their
energy. Questions of individual rights, such as
race and due process, are not the front-burner
issues at the court that they were a few years
ago, perhaps because the justices have reached
a kind of settlement: affirmative action has
been sharply limited, while at the same time the
due process guarantee is alive and well.
Instead, what animates the justices are
questions of the court's own institutional turf in
particular and the allocation of governmental
power in general, both among the branches of
the federal government and between
Washington and the states.
"The court is reflecting in a bunch of
different doctrines the general sense that the
federal government is too big, too powerful,
too incompetent," said Professor Christopher
H. Schroeder of Duke University Law School.
Cases this year in which the court struck down
state incursions into the federal government's
authority in foreign affairs were not the
contrary, he said, reflecting instead "the classic
18th-century notion that where we need the
federal government, we need it internationally."
The lines in the court's federalism debate
have been clearly drawn, with the open
question being where the court plans to take it
next. One logical path, Professor Schroeder
said, would be in the libertarian direction of
giving individual citizens more ammunition
against government authority through
strengthening the Fifth Amendment doctrine
against the uncompensated "taking" of private
property, for example. But justice Scalia has
pushed the takings argument as far as his
current colleagues seem willing to follow, trying
but not quite succeeding in making much land-
use regulation constitutionally questionable as a
"regulatory taking" for which landowners must
be compensated.
So, like questions that this election-year
term has raised about the court's future, this is
one that does not have a clear answer. Even a
casual look at the term's 5-to-4 decisions shows
what could lie ahead, depending on which
president gets to fill which vacancies, if any.
The four liberal dissenters from the decisions
curbing federal authority would move quickly
to overturn those precedents if they gained
another vote, while at the same time, Justice
Thomas and three other conservative justices --
minus Justice O'Connor -- who came up one
vote short of dramatically lowering the barrier
to public aid to parochial schools would not
hesitate to move quickly in that direction. To
that degree, the term that ended last week is as
much prologue as last word.
Following are summaries of the term's most
important decisions.
Abortion
The court ruled that because the procedure
that abortion opponents call partial-birth
abortion may be the most medically appropriate
way of terminating some pregnancies, it cannot
constitutionally be banned. The 5-to-4 decision,
Stenberg v. Carhart, No. 99-830, invalidated a
Nebraska law while rendering the laws of 30
other states unconstitutional as well. Justice
Breyer wrote the majority opinion; the
dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Scalia and Thomas and, surprisingly in light of
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his earlier support for abortion rights, Justice
Kennedy.
By a 6-to-3 vote, the court ruled that a
Colorado law creating a "no-approach" zone
outside medical offices did not violate the free
speech rights of abortion protesters seeking to
urge women not to go through with their
abortions. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in
Hill v. Colorado, No. 98-1856. Justices Scalia,
Thomas and Kennedy dissented.
Federalism
By the 5-to-4 vote that has become familiar
from the court's increasingly bitter debate over
the proper allocation of federal and state
authority, the court struck down a central
provision of one federal law, the Violence
Against Women Act, and invalidated the
application of the federal age discrimination law
to the states.
On the other hand, when the justices saw a
case as presenting a straightforward issue of the
supremacy of federal law -- as opposed to a
federal incursion into a traditional area of state
authority -- the court was most often
unanimous in upholding the federal law.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in the Violence Against Women Act case,
United States v. Morrison, No. 99-5, declared
that "the Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly
local." The decision invalidated the law's civil
damages provision, which permitted suits in
federal court by victims of crimes "motivated
by gender." The dissenters were Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
By the same 5-to-4 lineup, the court ruled
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, No. 98-
791, that Congress lacked authority to make the
states, as employers, liable to suit under the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. Writing for the majority, justice O'Connor
said the government's interest in eradicating age
discrimination on the job yielded to the states'
sovereign nmunity.
In another case involving state immunity,
the court avoided the Constitution and looked
only to Congress's intent in ruling that
Congress did not mean to make states liable to
suit under the False Claims Act for defrauding
the federal government. Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. Stevens, No. 98-1828, with
Justices Stevens and Souter dissenting.
In a unanimous decision, the court rejected
a states' rights challenge to the Drivers Privacy
Protection Act, a federal law that bars states
from selling personal information about
licensed drives and automobile owners. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Reno v.
Condon, No. 98-1464.
The court was also unanimous in upholding
the supremacy of federal law in two cases with
foreign policy implications. In one, Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, No. 99-474,
an opinion by Justice Souter held that a federal
law placing sanctions on Myanmar, the former
Burma, pre-empted a Massachusetts law that
withheld state business from companies that do
business with that nation's repressive military
regime.
In the second case, the court invalidated
Washington State's safety and environmental
regulations for tanker traffic along its coast.
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in United
States v. Locke, No. 98-1701.
Due Process
In a case about the right of parents to resist
interference in their children's lives from
grandparents and others, the court ruled 6 to 3
that a Washington State law went too far in
permitting a judge to order grandparents'
visiting rights over a mother's objection. The
splintered opinions in Troxel v. Granville, No.
99-138, invoked the Constitution's due process
protection for parental child-rearing decisions,
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but failed to agree on a definitive approach.
Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion that
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg joined. Justices Souter and Thomas
provided additional votes on the parents' side.
Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Scalia dissented.
Criminal Law
The court's 7-to-2 reaffirmation of Miranda
v. Arizona, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, was the leading criminal law case.
The court said in Dickerson v. United States,
No. 99-5525, that because Miranda "announced
a constitutional rule," Congress was not free to
replace the famous Miranda warnings with a
case-by-case test of whether a confession was
voluntary. The decision invalidated a 1968 law,
known as Section 3501, by which Congress had
purported to overrule Miranda. Justices Scalia
and Thomas dissented.
The court struck down New Jersey's hate
crime law, ruling 5 to 4 that the Constitution
requires the jury to make the central finding,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of whether a crime
was motivated by bias. The New Jersey law left
this job to the judge. The decision, Apprendi v.
New Jersey, No. 99-478, cast doubt on federal
and state laws in which judges make the crucial
findings that determine sentences. Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion; the
dissenters were Justices O'Connor, Breyer and
Kennedy, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The court's other criminal law cases were a
mix of search-and-seizure issues and cases
interpreting a 1996 law restricting state inmates'
access to federal court. The outcome was mixed
as well.
The court ruled, 5 to 4, that flight at the
mere sight of a police officer can often --
although not always -- be suspicious enough to
justify the police in conducting a stop-and-frisk
search. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority in Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-1036,
upholding the search of a man who bolted
from the sight of police cars converging on a
Chicago street. Justice Stevens dissented, joined
by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Criminal defendants prevailed in two other
search cases. Justice Ginsburg wrote for a
unanimous court that an anonymous tip that a
person is carrying a gun is not enough to justify
a stop-and-frisk search in the absence of some
indication that the information is reliable. The
case was Florida v. J.L., No. 98-1993. And the
court ruled 7 to 2 that, without some particular
suspicion of wrongdoing, law enforcement
agents cannot walk down the aisle of a bus
squeezing passengers' overhead carry-on bags
to see if any might contain contraband. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in
Bond v. U.S., No. 98-9349, while Justices
Breyer and Scalia dissented.
In interpreting the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, a 1996 law in
which Congress limited the rights of state
inmates to challenge their convictions in federal
court by means of petitions for writs of habeas
corpus, the court made clear that federal judges
still have an important role to play despite the
new law's limitations. Applying the new law, the
court overturned death sentences in two cases.
In the first, the court was unanimous in
ruling that a Virginia death row inmate, Michael
Williams, should not have been penalized by
the state's failure to provide needed evidence.
Justice Kennedy wrote for the court in Williams
v. Taylor, No. 99-6615.
A second ruling under the 1996 law, also
confusingly called Williams v. Taylor, No. 98-
8384, was more convoluted, producing two
controlling opinions. First, the court interpreted
a provision barring federal courts from setting
aside a state court decision unless the state
ruling was an "unreasonable" application of
federal law. The question was the meaning of
"unreasonable."
Just because a decision was wrong did not
make it necessarily unreasonable, Justice
O'Connor wrote in a 5-to-4 portion of the
ruling that was joined by Chief Justice
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Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia and
Thomas. In dissent, Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer said federal judges should
not have to defer to state court decisions they
regarded as incorrect, even if plausible.
But by a 6-to-3 vote, in a portion of the
opinion by Justice Stevens, the court then
granted relief to the inmate in this case, Terry
Williams, on the ground that he had not
received effective assistance of counsel. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and
Scalia dissented.
In an 8-to-1 decision, the court ruled that
documents produced in response to a broad
subpoena under a grant of immunity cannot be
used as evidence if the prosecutor did not
previously know of the documents' existence.
The case, United States v. Hubbell, No. 99-166,
grew out of Kenneth W. Starr's prosecution of
Webster L. Hubbell, the former associate
attorney general, on tax evasion charges. In an
opinion by Justice Stevens, the court ruled that
Mr. Hubbell's production of thousands of
personal financial records was a "testimonial
act" that was shielded by his immunity
agreement. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
First Amendment: Free Speech
In an important campaign finance case, the
court voted 6 to 3 to reaffirm the
constitutionality of low limits on campaign
contributions and rejected the argument that
such limits can be valid only if aimed at
documented instances of corruption. The case,
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
No. 98-963, was from Missouri, where a $1,000
contribution limit mirrors that of federal
campaign law. Justice Souter wrote the opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by
Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg and
Stevens. Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas
dissented. Several justices, although not a
majority, wrote separately to suggest that
beyond this case, the court's entire approach to
campaign finance might have to be
reconsidered in the future.
The court ruled unanimously that public
universities can collect student activity fees
even from students who object to particular
activities, as long as the policy is neutral as to
the student organizations' viewpoints. Justice
Kennedy wrote the opinion in Board of
Regents v. Southworth, No. 98-1189, a case
from the University of Wisconsin that was
followed closely throughout the higher
education world.
Sexually explicit expression was at issue in
two cases. By a 6-to-3 vote, the court upheld a
nude dancing ordinance from Erie, Pa., that
requires dancers to wear at least pasties and a
G-string. Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality
opinion for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy and Breyer, while Justices
Scalia and Thomas voted separately to uphold
the ordinance. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and
Souter dissented in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,
No. 98-1161.
In the second case, the court voted 5 to 4
to strike down a federal law that required many
cable television systems to limit sexually explicit
channels to late-night hours. Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion, U.S. v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, No. 98-1682, was joined
by Justices Stevens, Thomas, Souter and
Ginsburg. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Breyer, Scalia and O'Connor dissented.
First Amendment: Association
The court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote that the
Boy Scouts can ban gay members because
opposition to homosexuality is part of the
organization's expressive message. Application
of New Jersey's anti-discrimination law violated
the Boy Scouts' right to freedom of association,
Chief Justice Rehnquist said for the court in
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, No. 99-699.
The dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
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The court struck down California's blanket
primary, under which all voters get a single
ballot from which they can choose candidates
of any party affiliation. The system stripped
parties of their right to political association,
Justice Scalia said for the 7-to-2 majority in
California Democratic Party v. Jones, No. 99-
401. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented.
First Amendment: Religion
The court ruled 6 to 3 that the practice of
organized, student-led prayer at public high
school football games amounted to an
unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,
No. 99-62. The dissenters were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas.
At the same time, the court lowered the
barriers against public aid to religious schools,
upholding a federal program that places
computers and other equipment in parochial
school classrooms. The vote in Mitchell v.
Helms, No. 98-1648, was 6 to 3, but the
majority splintered over how far to go. Justice
Thomas wrote a plurality opinion for himself,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, with a narrower concurring opinion
by Justices O'Connor and Breyer declined to go
so far.
Civil Rights
In an employment discrimination case, the
court ruled unanimously that even in the
absence of smoking-gun evidence of
discrimination, a plaintiff can prevail by
showing that an employer's innocent-sounding
explanation for its action was a lie. Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion in Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, No. 99-536.
The court overturned a provision of
Hawaii's constitution under which only
descendants of the native Hawaiians can vote in
elections for trustees of the state's Office of
Hawaiian Affairs. Voting 7 to 2 in Rice v.
Cayetano, No. 98-818, the court found the
provision to violate the 15th Amendment,
which provides that the right to vote shall not
be denied on account of race. Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion. Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg dissented.
In an important voting rights case, the
court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote that the Justice
Department must approve districting changes --
even those adopted with a discriminatory
purpose -- as long as the changes leave minority
voters no worse off than before. Prevention of
backsliding is the only test for Justice
Department "preclearance" under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the court said in Reno v.
Bossier Parish, No. 98-405. Justice Scalia wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Thomas. Justice Souter wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg
and Breyer.
Federal Law and Regulation
The court ruled 5 to 4 that the Food and
Drug Administration never received authority
from Congress to regulate tobacco products.
The court's interpretation of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act was a blow to the
Clinton administration's anti-smoking policy;
the invalidated rules restricted the marketing of
cigarettes to children and teenagers. Justice
O'Connor wrote the court's opinion in F.D.A.
v. Brown & Williamson, No. 98-1152, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Breyer dissented,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Ginsburg.
Interpreting the federal law that governs
employee health benefits, the court ruled
unanimously that the financial incentives that
health maintenance organizations give doctors
to hold down costs do not amount to a
violation of the federal duty to put patients'
interests first. The decision, Pegram v.
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Herdrich, No. 98-1949, handed the patients'
rights debate back to Congress. Justice Souter
wrote the opinion.
Voting 5 to 4, the court upheld a provision
of a recent federal law, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, that restricts the authority of
federal judges to keep in place court orders
governing the operation of state and local
prison systems. Justice O'Connor wrote the
majority opinion in Miller v. French, No. 99-
224, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Justices
Souter, Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg dissented.
In an important environmental case, the
court upheld the ability of private plaintiffs to
invoke so-called citizen suit provisions of
federal environmental law and bring lawsuits to
stop pollution. Justice Ginsburg wrote the 7-to-
2 opinion in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,
No. 98-822. Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented.
Chart: "Supreme Court Scorecard"
The Supreme Court concluded a session of
blockbuster cases last week. A look at some of
the most important:
ISSUE AND CASE
ABORTION -- Steinberg v. Carhart
States cannot ban partial birth abortions. Ruled
with the majority: O'Connor, Souter, Stevens,
Breyer, Ginsburg
FEDERALISM -- United States v. Morrison
Victims of private acts of discrimination cannot
seek damages in federal court. Ruled with the
majority: Rhenquist, Thomas, Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia
DUE PROCESS -- Troxel v. Granville
Parents have the right to resist interference in
their children's lives from grandparents and
others. Ruled with majority: Rhenquist,
Thomas, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg
CRIMINAL LAW -- Dickerson v. United
States
Congress cannot overrule the requirement that
Miranda rights be read to criminal suspects.
Ruled with the majority: Rhenquist, Kennedy,
O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg
RELIGION -- Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe
Organized, student-led prayer at public high
school football games is unconstitutional. Ruled
with the majority: Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter,
Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg
ASSOCIATION -- Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale
A group can ban gay members if homosexuality
is against its expressive message.Ruled with the
majority: Rhenquist, Thomas, Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia
Copyright Q 2000 The New York Times
Company
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A COURT REVOLUTION BREWING?
Justices Tinker with Federalism Trend, but Watch Out Next Term
The National La wJournal
Monday, June 5, 2000
Marcia Coyle and Harvey Berkman
Despite the high drama inherent in rulings
that strike down socially conscious federal
legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court's latest
round of federalism activity indicates that the
court's majority is still tinkering at the margins
of a major constitutional shift.
"Nothing this term is dramatic in itself, but
it adds to the cumulative direction in which at
least a five-person majority is going," says
constitutional law scholar Stephen Gardbaum,
of the University of California at Los Angeles
School of Law. "It's sort of adding at the
edges, clarifying some of the details."
But as the equally reliable four-person
dissenters indicate, the court's decisions aren't
exactly inconsequential. And four cases already
slotted for review next term could well provide
the key to whether the court remains at the
margins or engages in a revolution that the
dissenters warn would create a federal
government not merely of limited but of
actually enervated powers.
At the top of the list is a challenge involving
the government's authority under the
Constitution's commerce clause to regulate
intrastate waters that are potential habitats for
migratory birds. The case, Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 99-1178, will
build on this term's key commerce clause case,
in which the justices struck down a civil
damages remedy in the federal Violence Against
Women Act because it lacked a strong enough
connection to interstate commerce. U.S. v.
Morrison, nos. 99-5 and 99-29.
The justices also will explore what it means to
be a worker "engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" in the context of how the Federal
Arbitration Act affects a job bias suit brought
under state law in state court.
And in two other strands of the high court's
federalism push -- challenges under the 11th
Amendment's sovereign immunity provision
and Sec. 5 of the 14th Amendment -- the
justices will decide whether Congress had the
power to subject states to suits under the
Americans With Disabilities Act. (This term,
the court concluded that federal authority
under Sec. 5 does not allow employees to sue
state entities for age discrimination.)
Finally, in an entirely new and potentially
far-reaching front in the court's recalibration of
national power, the justices will examine how
much authority Congress can delegate to a
federal agency -- in this case, the
Environmental Protection Agency's broad
statutory authority to promulgate clean air
standards "requisite to protect the public
health."
Not just states' rights
The justices on May 22 issued the final two
of their five federalism-related challenges in the
current term. Unlike last term's federalism
rulings -- which used the 11th Amendment to
bar private damages suits against states under
federal patent, trademark and wage-and-hour
laws -- this term's quintet involved all three
active areas of the court's federalism
jurisprudence: the 11th Amendment, the
commerce clause and Sec. 5 of the 14th
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Amendment. And they dispelled any remaining
notion that the Rehnquist majority was simply
interested in protecting "states' rights."
"The issue, in short, is enumerated powers,"
says Roger Pilon, vice president for legal affairs
at the libertarian Cato Institute. "The point is,
quite simply, the court is moving toward
determining whether Congress or the executive
branch has the power at issue, quite apart from
whether that power may or may not trample on
a state power."
If this were a court out solely to guard
"states' rights," its 9-0 decision to uphold a
federal law forbidding states from selling their
drivers' license data would have gone the other
way, 5-4. Reno v. Condon, No. 98-1464. Instead,
the court had little difficulty declaring that the
statute was a legitimate expression of
congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce.
Similarly, an activist states'-rights majority
would not have restrained itself from using the
11th Amendment to block suits brought by
individual whistleblowers charging state entities
with defrauding the federal government or
from striking a federal arson statute on the
grounds that private residences are not
interstate commerce.
Instead, in both cases, the court stuck to a
more mundane statutory approach. In the first
case -- Vermont Ageny of Natural Resources v.
U.S., No. 98-1828 -- the court declared that the
provision of the federal False Claims Act
allowing whistleblowers to sue "any person"
who defrauds the federal government was not
meant to cover states. And in the second --
Jones v. U.S., No. 99-5739 -- the court
unanimously concluded that the federal statute
at issue, which made it a crime to burn any
property "used in interstate commerce .. . or in
any activity affecting interstate ... commerce,"
did not cover private residences because the
function of such residences is not "use" in
interstate commerce.
And even in the court's most important
commerce clause case to date -- the Violence
Against Women Act decision in Monison --
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist insisted that
the prior court cases upholding the nation's
core federal civil-rights laws -- all enacted under
the commerce clause -- remain viable.
"Conservatives can read too much into
these decisions -- they don't backtrack from
decades of law. And liberals too easily cry
Chicken Little [in this area], suggesting that the
sky's going to collapse," says Ronald Rotunda, a
professor at the University of Illinois School of
Law who last year issued the third edition of his
five-volume Treatise on Constitutional Law, co-
authored with fellow Illinois professor, John
Nowak.
As a point of comparison, one court
member is calling for a radical revision in the
court's commerce clause jurisprudence. In his
Morrison concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas
reiterated his earlier call to eliminate one of the
court's three tests for whether a federal statute
passes commerce clause muster.
But it is worth noting, says Bruce Fein, a
Reagan-era Justice Department official who
now writes a column for the conservative
Washington Times, that Justice Thomas'
suggestion remains "a soliloquy. It isn't even a
duet yet."
Advancing the ball
Even if the court is operating at the
margins, it's still operating, with ramifications
for Congress -- and the lower courts. And
there is no denying that the court did advance
the federalism ball regarding the commerce
clause and Sec. 5 of the 14th Amendment.
In Kimel v. Floida Board of Regents, nos. 98-
791 and 98-796, a 5-4 court held that Congress
lacked authority under Sec. 5 to apply the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
to the states. The imposition of the act on the
states, wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, was
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"disproportionate to any unconstitutional
conduct that conceivably could be targeted by
the act."
The court's ruling builds on its landmark
decision in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997), in which it struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act on the ground that it
usurped the court's role in defining the limits of
constitutional rights.
"In Boerne, the court said Congress can't
redefine rights, it can only enact remedial
measures," says Professor Larry Kramer, of
New York University School of Law. "That
decision wouldn't matter so much as long as
sufficient leeway is given to Congress in
shaping remedies. But the court in Kimelis
saying, 'We're going to reserve authority to say
whether the means/ends connection is good
enough."'
Agreeing, Professor Douglas Kmiec, of
Pepperdine University School of Law, adds,
"We still don't know the meaning of what is
proportional. I see that as a question of
deference to Congress. But it's clear the
conservative members do not. They're going to
place the court's conception of constitutional
rights against created statutory rights side-by-
side. And to the extent the statutory right is
more protective -- as one could argue
protection for the disabled under the
[Americans With Disabilities Act] is -- they will
set one congressional statute aside after another
on those grounds."
The Sec. 5 power, he says, has become
"very, very tiny, and a backup role to the court's
own definition of constitutional claims."
The Monison decision also answered a
question that was raised by the court's landmark
decision in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
when the court for the first time in 60 years
invalidated a federal law -- the Gun-Free School
Zone Act -- on commerce clause grounds.
Lopez seemed to indicate that a federal law
supported by careful congressional findings
about the national economic aspect of the
regulated activity -- findings that the gun law
lacked -- would be constitutional. But in
Morrison, the court said that the mountain of
evidence Congress compiled, which found a
nexus between violence against women and
interstate commerce, was irrelevant because the
underlying activity lacked any significant
commercial element.
That's why the upcoming wetlands case is
so important. Like violence against women, it
involves activity that is fundamentally
noneconomic: the condition and existence of
intrastate bodies of water. Also like the
Violence Against Women Act, the wetlands law
is supported on the ground that certain
noneconomic activity affects interstate
commerce when aggregated. Specifically, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit found
that the destruction of the birds' natural
habitats, in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce because many people
spend billions of dollars on hunting, trapping
and observing birds.
"It's one thing to say you've got a bench
with a group of justices who share a kind of
general predisposition on a big topic like
federalism, and a whole other thing to say they
have a coherent, thought-out plan as to what to
do across that doctrinal area," says Prof.
Kramer. "They can be lumped together on that
first level, but not on the specific doctrinal
level."
Prof. Kiniec agrees:
"There's no question that the thing that
unites them all is a constitutional vision that
sees individual rights as better protected when
power is divided between the federal and state
governments. How that underlying
constitutional theory gets elaborated in each of
these separate contexts is where there's still a
bit of sketchiness."
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E.J. Dionne
Attacks on 'the imperial judiciary' were once
the stuff of conservative polemics against a
'liberal activist' Supreme Court. That is about to
change.
In a shift that is momentous in both
historical and political terms, liberals are
beginning to sound alarms about
conservative justices using states' rights and
other doctrines to void environmental,
economic and social legislation. The liberal
fear is that the Supreme Court is marching back
to its pre-New Deal days when justices relied
on strict interpretations of property and
contract rights - and narrow interpretations of
governmental authority - to strike down laws
on wages, hours and other forms of business
regulation.
The first signs of the new disposition have
come on relatively narrow issues. This year, the
court struck down a law that allowed the
victims of rape and domestic violence to
sue their attackers in federal court. The court
said this was a state issue. It also said state
employees couldn't use federal laws to bring age
discrimination suits against their state
governments. A lower court has put
environmental regulations into question, saying
Congress had delegated too much power to the
Environmental Protection Agency.
What these actions have in common is a
direct challenge by the Supreme Court to the
power of Congress. 'The court has imposed by
fiat limitations on the exercise of federal
power,' says Sen. Joseph Biden, the former
Judiciary Committee chairman who is planning
to give two speeches in the next month
challenging the court's 'imperial' direction.
'The Supreme Court, in case after case, is
freely imposing its own view of sound public
policy - not constitutional law, but public
policy,' Biden said in an interview this week.
'What is at issue here is a question of power,
whether power will be exercised by an insulated
judiciary or by the elected representatives of
the people.'
Biden, a Delaware Democrat, acknowledges
that the phrase 'judicial activism' has 'often
been used by conservatives to criticize liberal
judges.' But 'under this Supreme Court, the
shoe is plainly on the other foot: It is now
conservative judges who are supplanting the
judgment of the people's representatives
and substituting their own.'
Biden's argument is important because he is
speaking not just for himself, but for an entire
school of judges and legal scholars who fear
that the court may be on the road to
invalidating many years of regulatory
legislation. On the court itself, Justices David
Souter, Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens
have raised questions about the trend. Souter,
for example, has warned of 'a return to the
untenable jurisprudence from which the
court extricated itself almost 60 years ago.'
David Strauss, a law professor at the
University of Chicago, argues that what unites
many of the recent decisions and arguments is a
desire to undermine regulation, whether
enacted by Congress, state legislatures or voter
referenda. The trend, he says, involves
'aggressive interpretation of federal statutes
where they pre-empt state regulation,' and
'narrow interpretation' of federal regulatory
statutes.
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'I don't think they care about the states,
they want to get rid of regulation,' Strauss says.
He argues that many judicial conservatives are
more interested in advancing a
stronger interpretation of property rights, than
in safeguarding states' rights.
Rep. Henry Waxman, a California
Democrat who is a supporter of federal
environmental and health rules, says the
saine inconsistency on states' rights doctrines is
not confined to the courts. He points to recent
efforts to pass federal laws pre-empting state
food safety regulations, such as
California's Proposition 65. The 1986 initiative
requires warning labels disclosing whether
products contain chemicals that cause cancer
or birth defects.
Supporters of federal pre-emption are
normally states' rights advocates in other areas,
Waxman says. But in this case, they 'want to
deny states the ability to act in their
traditional spheres of authority, which is to
protect the public health and safety.'
But the biggest fights will be in the courts,
and future Supreme Court appointments could
prove decisive in this ongoing struggle. Many of
the recent decisions overturning
congressional enactments were on 5-to-4 votes.
That raises the stakes in the debate between Al
Gore and George W. Bush over the differences
in the Supreme Court appointments each
would make.
The public argument between Gore and
Bush focuses largely on the abortion issue and
whether Roe vs. Wade - seen by conservatives
as a case of liberal overreach - will be retained
or overturned. But Biden says for the long run,
the more important argument will be over the
new conservative judicial activism.
The outcome of that debate will shape
federal policies for decades to come.
Copyright 0 2000 The Denver Post
Corporation
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William Rehnquist is such an imp. The
chief justice had a little fun the day the Supreme
Court announced its verdict in a case asking it
to junk the Miranda warning. Rehnquist is a
longtime critic of the 1966 Miranda decision.
So when he began to read from the opinion he
had written for the court, those in the audience
assumed the justices were about to overturn it.
Wrong. He and his colleagues were upholding
Miranda.
This Supreme Court seems to get a kick out
of surprising people. It's regarded as pro-law
enforcement, but it upheld Miranda and
favored criminal defendants in 6 of 8
constitutional cases this term. It vindicated the
American Civil Liberties Union by banning
public-address prayers before high school
football games--then dismayed the ACLU by
allowing federal aid to parochial schools. A
court dominated by Republican appointees
didn't mind siding with the hedonists at the
Playboy Channel to deep-six a federal law
restricting pornography on cable TV.
Both sides of the political divide can find
reasons to love and hate the Rehnquist court.
But that doesn't mean it has been making
decisions by flipping a coin. The court is not
consistently liberal or conservative, but it is
pretty consistently libertarian. When it rules,
you can generally bet it will rule in favor of
protecting individual freedom.
That means keeping our leaders from
getting carried away. This term, the court
emphasized its view that some powers belong
to state governments, some powers belong to
the federal government and some powers
belong to no government. And when any
government tnes to exercise a power it is not
granted under the Constitution, the justices
waste no time putting a stop to it.
Massachusetts, for example, levied
economic sanctions against Burma to protest
human-rights abuses--sanctions that conflicted
with a federal law. The court said the state
couldn't legislate on that subject because
Congress had pre-empted the field. It reached a
similar conclusion in throwing out Washington
state's attempt to impose its own safety and
environmental regulations on ocean-going
tankers.
More often, though, the court was busy
rescuing the states from federal encroachments
rather than the other way around. It struck
down the Violence Against Women Act
because Congress lacks the authority to regulate
on that subject. It overturned the conviction of
a man federally prosecuted for arson of a
private home because the crime was beyond the
scope of federal law.
The court used these opportunities to
reaffirm what Rehnquist said in the landmark
1995 Lopez case: "The Constitution creates a
federal government of enumerated powers." If
a power is not mentioned or implied in the
Constitution, the federal government can't
exercise it.
Keeping lawmaking institutions in their
proper spheres is necessary because it
safeguards liberty and democracy. As the court
said in the Lopez decision, "A healthy balance
of power between the states and the federal
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government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front."
In many cases, though, the court is not
protecting the federal government from the
states or the states from the federal government
but shielding the individual from either. This
year, it blocked New Jersey's attempt to force
the Boy Scouts to accept gays and struck down
California's "open primary" because they
violated freedom of association. It invalidated a
federal law regulating sexually oriented cable
TV channels because it infringed on freedom of
expression.
It said a state law mandating visitation
rights for grandparents abridged the right of
parents to direct their children's upbringing. It
said the Miranda warnings were needed to
protect criminal suspects from police abuse.
The libertarian Institute for Justice in
Washington recently reported that in the last
eight years, "The court has been quite reliable
in protecting individual liberties. Out of 45
cases examined, 35 (or 78 percent) resulted in a
pro-liberty decision."
The religion cases illuminate the court's
approach. It banned a pre-game prayer at Texas
high school football games because the practice
forced the unwilling to take part in an officially
prescribed religious ritual. But it said schools
that teach religion may get the same federal aid
as schools that don't.
These rulings might be portrayed as
contradictory, since one infuriated
conservatives and the other offended liberals.
But both decisions are rooted in a fundamental
respect for the choices individuals make about
faith.
The debate over the Constitution was once
described as a dispute between those who think
it creates islands of freedom in a sea of
government powers and those who think it
creates islands of government powers in a sea
of freedom. For a long time, the Supreme
Court was in the first camp. Not anymore.
Copyright © 2000 Chicago Tribune Company
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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Rehnquist Court Understands Its Authority in the Same Terns Warren
Court Did
Dallas Morning News
Sunday, July 23, 2000
Tery Eastland
The Supreme Court recently finished
another term, and in plowing through the key
opinions, one finds some revealing text. It is a
footnote (yes, the notes do matter) in U.S. vs.
Morrison.
Morrison involved the constitutionality of
a federal law providing a civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence. The
court, with Chief Justice William Rehnquist
writing for a majority of five, found that the
Constitution doesn't allow Congress to pass
such a law.
That wasn't a surprising result, given the
court's views of congressional power and
federalism. But in declaring what the
Constitution requires in those areas, the chief
justice emphasized in a footnote that in this
business of constitutional interpretation the
Supreme Court is, well, supreme:
It is, he wrote, a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional
system that the Supreme Court is "supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution."
The quoted passage came from Cooper vs.
Aaron, a unanimous 1958 decision by the
Warren Court. In condemning attempts by state
and local officials in Arkansas to frustrate a
Little Rock school desegregation plan, the
justices said that the Supreme Court is
"supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution" and that its interpretations of the
Constitution are binding on all government
officials.
The justices joining Mr. Rehnquist in
Morrison were Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas, who together with the chief justice are
regarded in press accounts as "conservatives,"
and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor, the so-called moderates. That
quintet controlled the outcomes of 14 of the 21
five-to-four decisions this term (out of 74 in
all). Seen as a "conservative" majority, it is more
or less what is meant by "the Rehnquist Court."
That this "conservative" court understands
its authority in the same terms as the Warren
Court did hasn't made headlines. But it is a fact
- an important one.
Until the first decades of this century, the
court understood its power to interpret the
Constitution in decidedly more humble terms:
Our job is deciding cases, and if we are asked to
resolve a conflict between a statute, say, and a
claim based on the Constitution, then we have
to interpret the Constitution to decide the case.
That understanding of judicial review, as
University of California-Berkeley law professor
John Yoo writes in a forthcoming issue of the
Michigan Law Review, "left ample room for the
other branches to engage in constitutional
interpretation while performing their own
constitutional duties."
Judicial review didn't mean judicial
supremacy - until the Warren Court. The
Warren Court's pretensions, explicitly
confirmed by Cooper, drew academic criticism.
And eventually, the court's decisions provoked
political response. Starting with Richard Nixon,
Republican presidents sought to counter the
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Warren Court and the revolutionary change it
had effected, often in behalf of liberal causes,
by choosing conservative justices. But this
promise wasn't necessarily a promise to pick
justices opposed to judicial supremacy.
And now the results are in. Presidents
Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and
George Bush appointed eight of the last 10
justices. And so we have had the Burger Court
and now the Rehnquist Court. In some
respects, those courts have proved more
restrained than the Warren Court. And
certainly, they have had different
preoccupations, such as the Rehnquist Court's
concern for federalism. But the Burger Court
saw itself as "supreme in the exposition" of the
Constitution. And so has the Rehnquist Court.
Morrison is only one example. Another is
Boerne vs. Flores (1997), in which the court
rejected any congressional role in interpreting
the Bill of Rights that might produce results at
odds with its own decisions.
Still another, from the term just past, is
Dickerson vs. U.S., in which the court struck
down a federal law responding to the (Warren)
Court's notorious Miranda rules, even though a
majority couldn't say the Constitution
compelled those rules and, therefore,
nullification of the statute at issue in the case.
Here - talk about supreme! - the court placed
itself over the Constitution.
There are many good arguments to be
made for a humbler court, chief among them
that it would be better for us if we the people,
ostensibly a self-governing people, were able to
promote our constitutional understandings
through the ordinary political process. But
survey data show that among the three
branches of government, the Supreme Court is
the one we the people most highly regard.
Apparently, we don't mind our supreme
Supreme Court. And no one in the other
branches wants to make it an issue. Nor do
certain presidential aspirants in Nashville and
Austin.
But should we be so complacent? Lincoln
in his time thought not, and his warning
shouldn't be forgotten: "If the policy of the
government upon vital questions affecting the
whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made in litigation between parties in
personal actions, the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal."
Copyright 0 2000 The Dallas Morning News
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AN ACTIVIST COURT MIXES ITS HIGH-PROFILE MESSAGES
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 2, 2000
Edward Walsh
When the Supreme Court convened last
October for its final term of the 20th century,
there was widespread agreement that it would
be a particularly important, perhaps historic,
session. Even at the outset of the term, there
were enough high-profile, contentious issues on
the docket to ensure more than the usual share
of close votes and significant decisions.
Nine months later, as the justices wrapped
up their work for the term, the court had more
than met those lofty expectations. It considered
and ruled on cases touching on some of the
most controversial issues of modem American
life--abortion, school prayer, gay rights, aid to
parochial schools, tobacco regulation and the
rights of criminal defendants.
Less clear was whether any overriding
theme or message emanated from the court in
its 14th year under the stewardship of Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, the conservative
Arizonan who is one of seven justices
appointed by Republican presidents.
"It is still a conservative court that also has
become one of the most activist courts in
American history," said Steven R. Shapiro,
national legal director for the American Civil
Liberties Union.
Yet, Shapiro acknowledged, during this
term the court also delivered a number of
"significant victories for civil liberties," among
them the emphatic reaffirmation of its
landmark 1966 Miranda decision, which
requires police to inform criminal suspects of
their rights to remain silent and be represented
by an attorney during interrogation.
"I think this term forced us to make a much
more nuanced appraisal of the Rehnquist
court," said Erwin Chemerinsky, a University of
Southern California law school professor. "In
some areas it remains a very activist,
conservative court. In other areas, it was a court
that was bitterly disappointing to
conservatives."
The same court that struck down
restrictions on cable television providers of
sexually explicit material in the name of free
speech was also kind to the business
community and treated criminal defendants
well this term, several experts noted.
The court's mixed record is certain to
galvanize activists on both sides of the political
spectrum during this year's presidential
campaign as they make the case that the next
president could determine the ideological
balance of power on the closely divided court
for a generation to come.
John G. Roberts Jr., an appellate lawyer
with the Washington law firm of Hogan &
Hartson, believes conservatives may have the
easier time doing that, if only because they
suffered setbacks in some of the most
celebrated cases of the term.
Indeed, the court's nominal five-justice
conservative majority splintered enough to
produce outcomes that dismayed conservatives
in three of the most closely watched cases of
the term.
In Dickerson v. United States, the justices
voted 7 to 2 to reaffirm the Miranda ruling.
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Rehnquist, a frequent and vocal critic of the
Miranda decision, wrote the majority opinion.
In Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, the court ruled 6 to 3 that a school-
sponsored method of allowing students to lead
prayers before high school football games in a
Texas school district violated the constitutional
prohibition against establishment of religion.
And in probably the most emotional case of
the term, the court, in a 5 to 4 decision in
Stenberg v. Carhart, struck down a Nebraska
law banning the controversial procedure known
to opponents as "partial birth" abortion.
But in decisions that balanced those
conservative disappointments, the court also
said that the Boy Scouts of America had the
right to expel an adult Scout leader because he
is gay; that the Food and Drug Administration
does not have authority to regulate the tobacco
industry; and that government money can be
used to provide computers and other modem
instructional materials to religious schools.
In many of these high-profile cases, the
court did not veer from well-established paths.
Dickerson ratified a law enforcement practice
that has become ingrained in American culture.
Abortion rights advocates expressed alarm over
the narrow vote that struck down the Nebraska
law, but there was no sign in the opinion of a
threat to the underlying right to abortion,
established 27 years ago in Roe v. Wade. The
school prayer decision was in line with similar
restrictions on state-sponsored prayer that
stretch back to 1962.
Legal scholars differed over whether the 6
to 3 ruling in the school aid case, Mitchell v.
Helms, signaled a willingness by the court to
approve school voucher programs, a fervent
conservative hope. But that is an issue that will
have to be decided in the future. On the
immediate issue before the justices--whether
government funds could be used for computers
and computer software in religious schools--the
court ruled as it had in 1968, when it was asked
the same question about textbooks.
"I don't think the outcomes of the cases are
particularly jarring," said Douglas W. Kmiec, a
law school professor at Pepperdine University
in California. "There were both liberal and
conservative victories, but they were not so
much in either direction that they were
profoundly out of the mainstream.
"They kind of confirmed a contemporary
sense of justice. A nonlawyer or the man on the
street would say the results were within the
range of reasonableness."
According to several legal experts, the term
once again demonstrated the hallmark of the
Rehnquist court. "There is a label you can put
on this term and that is 'judicial supremacy,'
said Susan Low Bloch, a Georgetown
University Law School professor. " 'We are
going to tell you. We are going to tell you, the
Congress, you, the states.'
"It's striking the number of conservative
justices who don't like Miranda, but they like
even less having Congress trying to modify
what the Supreme Court has done."
According to Walter Dellinger, a former
solicitor general in the Clinton administration
and a lawyer with the Washington firm of
O'Melveny & Myers, the Rehnquist court has
invalidated 24 acts of Congress in the past five
years. "If that's not a record, it's close to it," he
said.
Added Akil Amar, a Yale Law School
professor: "The biggest theme is that this is a
very assertive court that is not afraid of
invalidating everyone else. The only thing it's
afraid of is admitting it made a mistake."
Two cases showed the court's leanings
toward enhancing state prerogatives at the
expense of the federal government. The court
struck down a section of the Violence Against
Women Act that allowed female victims of
violence to sue their attackers in federal court,
and held that state workers cannot sue their
employers under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
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But in some cases, the states fared no
better, especially when the issue involved
traditional federal responsibilities. The court
ruled that federal law preempted an attempt by
Massachusetts to deny state contracts to
companies that do business with Burma and
Washington state's effort to regulate oil tankers
in its coastal waters.
In another case, the justices ruled that it
was not California lawmakers, but the people of
California, who erred when they approved a
ballot measure instituting a new "blanket"
primary election system that allowed voters to
pick candidates from any political party. The
court said the system violated the free
association rights of political parties to choose
their own nominees.
"This is a court that is confident of its
capacity to make decisions and, when it comes
to interpreting the Constitution, this is a court
that believes state governments, Congress, the
lower courts should take a back seat to its
interpretations," Dellinger said.
He added: "I think John Marshall, who
established the tradition of judicial review in
Marbury v. Madison, would be proud of this
court, even if he disagreed with some of its ...
decisions."
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE TERM
The Supreme Court this session ruled on
cases that touched on some of the most
controversial issues of modem American life --
abortion, school prayer, gay rights, aid to
religious schools and tobacco legislation. These
are among the most significant rulings:
CASE: Stenberg v. Carhart
DECISION: Nebraska's "partial birth"
abortion law -- which is similar to 30 other state
laws -- places an "undue burden" on a woman's
right to end her pregnancy.










CASE: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
DECISION: The Boys Scouts of America
can legally expel a Scout leader because he is
gay.










CASE: Troxel v. Granville
DECISION: A law allowing visitation
rights for grandparents and others infringes on
parents' "fundamental right" to make decisions
about their children.











CASE: Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe
DECISION: Prayers led by students at
Texas high school football games violate
constitutional prohibitions.










CASE: Mitchell v. Helms
DECISION: Governments can distribute
computers and other instructional gear to
private schools without violating constitutional
church-state prohibitions.










CASE: Dickerson v. United States
DECISION: Congress cannot overturn the
34-year-old Miranda warnings that police must
give suspects because the advisories are rooted
in the Constitution.










CASE: Florida v. J.L.
DECISION: Police may not stop and frisk
someone based merely on an anonymous tip
that he is carrying a gun.










CASE: Illinois v. Wardlow
DECISION: Police generally may stop and
frisk someone who runs at the mere site of an
officer.











CASE: Williams v. Taylor
DECISION: A federal judge's authority to
overrule a state court decision in certain death
penalty cases is limited.










CASE: Pegram v. Herdrich
DECISION: HMOs cannot be sued in
federal court for offering bonuses to doctors
who hold down costs.










CASE: FDA v. Brown & Williamson
DECISION: The Food and Drug
Administration does not have the power to
regulate tobacco.










CASE: Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council
DECISION: Federal law preempts a
Massachusetts statute that penalized companies
doing business with Burma.










CASE: California Democratic Party v.
Jones
DECISION: California's "blanket" primary
infringes on political parties' rights to free
association.











CASE: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri PAC
DECISION: A Missouri law that imposes
strict dollar limits on political contributions
does not impinge on free speech.










CASE: United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group
DECISION: A law requiring cable
providers of sexually explicit material to "fully
scramble" their signals violates consitutional
free speech guarantees.










CASE: Erie v. Pap's A.M.
DECISION: Cities have the authority to
ban nude dancing when they can show harmful
"secondary effects" on a community.










CASE: United States v. Morrison
DECISION: Congress overstepped its
authority in the Violence Against Women Act
when it gave women the right to sue attackers
in federal court.











CASE: Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
DECISION: State workers who were
discriminated against because of their age
cannot sue under federal law.
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O'CONNOR, THE 'GO-TO' JUSTICE
USA Today
Wednesday, July 12, 2000
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON -- It was the Supreme
Court's annual spring musicale, and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor was presiding. The 200
guests sat erect and knee-to-knee as O'Connor
introduced the artists, among them a string
quartet with 300-year-old Stradivarius violins.
The May event was vintage O'Connor:
scripted and perfectly timed, her opening
remarks charming but succinct. After the
concert, but before a private dinner with the
musicians, the efficient justice didn't waste a
minute. Back she went to her chambers to
sneak in some work.
By the end of the term June 28, O'Connor
would write the court's ruling that Washington
state violated parents' rights by giving
grandparents broad visiting privileges to
grandchildren. She also would solidify the
court's majority in rejecting Nebraska's ban on
"partial-birth" abortions and would outline the
court's standard for deciding when public aid to
parochial schools is constitutional.
On a divided court that took on its most
significant agenda in a decade, no one shaped
the law as much as O'Connor. It reflected a
simple truth about today's Supreme Court: 19
years after her appointment as the high court's
first female justice, O'Connor has become, in
today's vernacular, "The Man."
In the 1999-2000 term, O'Connor compiled
the best "win-loss" record among the nine
justices: She voted in the majority in all but four
of the 73 cases the court decided. Her values,
conservative but flexible on social issues, are
close to those of America's political center and
have made her a bridge between the court's left
and right wings. She is the "go-to" justice when
the bench is split and looking for compromise
reasonmg.
Her place at the center of the court,
alongside Justice Anthony Kennedy, has long
been recognized, particularly since a 1992
decision in which the two provided key votes in
upholding abortion rights.
More recently, O'Connor has solidified her
leading role in many more areas of law. What is
the Supreme Court's view on affirmative
action? Read O'Connor's opinion. On voting
rights? Read O'Connor. Sexual harassment?
O'Connor. States' rights? O'Connor.
Off the bench, too, she is at the center of
the social events that foster collegiality on the
court. If there is a party to be organized, a
bridge game to be arranged or an official trip to
be taken by the justices, O'Connor is probably
in charge. She was with Justice Harry Blackmun
when he obtained a grand piano for the court
and began the spring musicale 12 years ago.
After he retired in 1994, she took it over.
Her self-discipline and drive are legendary,
in work and play. She skis and plays golf and
tenms.
"I used to say that whatever she did, she did
to perfection," says Alan Day, her younger
brother. "If you told her, 'The job is to wash
dishes well,' she would do even that better than
anyone."
At the court, she is a centrist in the mold of
the late Lewis Powell and a charmer in the
tradition of the late William Brennan. As the
only former elected politician on today's court -
- in Arizona, she was the first woman to be
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majority leader of the state Senate -- O'Connor
stands out among the justices in her ability to
work a room.
"There's no question in my mind that she
set out to become a central, pivotal figure" on
the court, says lawyer David Stewart, a former
clerk for Powell who has followed O'Connor's
record closely. She "shies away from broad
doctrine and partisan political approaches."
O'Connor's style is to carve out legal rules
incrementally. She's building a body of law one
case at a time rather than basing decisions on
overall ideology, as conservative Justice
Antonin Scalia does. O'Connor's decisions
rarely stray beyond the specific disputes before
her.
Her approach suits moderates and those
who want the court to play a minimal role in
American society, but it often confounds lower
courts, which have had trouble applying her
narrow rulings. It also has drawn the wrath of
conservatives and liberals alike; both say her
middle-of-the-road course doesn't offer the
legal leadership that the Supreme Court should
provide. In one abortion case, Scalia, who
frequently pecks at O'Connor's reasoning,
called her view "irrational" and said it could
"not be taken seriously."
"The problem is that we look to the
Supreme Court to tell us what the Constitution
means," says Neal Devins, a professor at the
College of William & Mary School of Law in
Virginia who has written about O'Connor. Her
"parsing of the law creates confusion and
opportunities for lower courts to use her
language to suit their personal preferences."
Yet the tall, tanned O'Connor, who at 70
shows no sign of slowing down and no
apparent effects of the breast cancer that
sapped her energy during the 19 80s, is often the
voice of today's Supreme Court.
"She knows her mind," says University of
Virginia law professor John Jeffries, a Powell
biographer and longtime court observer.
"Sometimes people think that being in the
middle is being wishy-washy. She is anything
but."
O'Connor declined to be interviewed for
this story; as with all the justices, she avoids
publicity and prefers to have her court opinions
speak for themselves. But through the years
O'Connor has opened up about the discipline
and drive with which she approaches her work.
"When I'm faced with a case, I do as much
research as I possibly can," she told a group of
fellow cancer survivors in 1994. "Then I make
my decision, and I don't look back."
A daughter of the West
The first of three children of Harry and
Ada Mae Day, O'Connor grew up with the
frontier spirit of the American West as a
backdrop. Her grandfather, Henry Clay Day,
moved from Vermont in the late 1800s and
began ranching on harsh terrain that eventually
became part of the state of Arizona. By 1930,
the Lazy B ranch was still far from any town or
hospital, so Ada Mae Day went to her mother's
home in El Paso to stay before giving birth to
the future justice.
As a child, O'Connor divided her life
between the Lazy B, where she learned to ride
horses and handle tractors, and El Paso, where
she was sent for school.
O'Connor has invoked the words of author
Wallace Stegner to describe her feelings for the
West: "There is something about exposure to
that big country that not only tells an individual
how small he is, but steadily tells him who he is."
A serious and high-achieving student, she
skipped two grades and graduated from high
school at 16. She then went to Stanford
University, where she earned economics and
law degrees. There she met John O'Connor, a
fellow law student whom she would marry, and
William Rehnquist, with whom she later would
share a seat on the nation's highest court.
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As a woman in a male-dominated
profession, O'Connor initially had a hard time
finding work as a lawyer. She eventually took a
job as deputy county attorney in San Mateo,
Calif., a fortuitous stroke that put her on a path
of public service and politics. In 1957, the
family settled in Phoenix, and she took a break
from the law to stay home with the couple's
three boys.
O'Connor returned to work as soon as they
all were in school. "I just never thought about
living my life without being in the workforce,"
she said in the mid-1980s.
In 1965, she became an assistant state
attorney general and took an interest in politics.
Four years later, running as a Republican, she
won a state Senate seat. Unlike some feminists
of her generation -- and, to some extent, fellow
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg -- O'Connor
didn't challenge the status quo as an outsider.
She learned to best it as an insider, and after
four years in the Arizona Senate, O'Connor
became majority leader.
In 1974, she ran for a post as a county
judge. She won, and in 1979 she was appointed
to the Arizona Court of Appeals. O'Connor's
reputation as a meticulous jurist spread, and in
1981, President Reagan made good on a
campaign promise to appoint a woman to the
Supreme Court by picking her.
Reagan biographer Lou Cannon wrote that
Reagan was immediately charmed by O'Connor
as they talked about their mutual love of
horseback riding before moving on to judicial
issues. Reagan didn't interview anyone else,
though many in what was then the "New
Right" objected. They feared that O'Connor
wouldn't oppose abortion.
From the start of her tenure on the court,
O'Connor aligned herself with conservative
bulwark Rehnquist. However, she was more
moderate on divisive social issues such as sex
discrimination, religious freedom and personal
liberties.
She made a mark on women's rights while
rejecting the notion that there was a "woman's"
approach to judging. "I think the important fact
about my appointment is not that I will decide
cases as a woman," she said just after joining
the court, "but that I am a woman who will get
to decide cases."
She has seemed especially sensitive to the
prejudice women face and what the law can do
about it. In 1982, O'Connor wrote an opinion
invalidating a women-only enrollment policy at
a Mississippi state nursing school, saying it
"tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively women's job."
Last year, O'Connor played a key role in a
ruling that public schools could be held liable
for failing to stop student sexual harassment.
In a stinging dissent, Kennedy said
O'Connor was ignoring the facts of school life
and inviting federal interference in local
matters. He wrote that the majority opinion
offered "little Johnny a perverse lesson in
federalism." O'Connor countered tersely from
the bench that her view would make sure "that
little Mary may attend class."
This term, O'Connor and Kennedy
disagreed in a 5-4 decision that struck down
state laws banning a medical procedure that
critics call "partial-birth" abortion. O'Connor
was a key vote for the majority, but then
offered a blueprint for states that still want to
ban the controversial procedure. It was typical
O'Connor: She steered a course down the
middle of the court's ideological spectrum but
kept the door open for a similar case to come
out differently.
Her opinions on government's race-based
policies, which take her well beyond any
traditional women's issues, are similarly cast.
She has authored the court's rulings
restricting affirmative action policies and voting
districts that are drawn to boost the political
power of blacks and Hispanics. Her view is that
programs designed to boost opportunities for
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minorities often are just as unacceptable as poll
taxes and other practices that were designed to
keep blacks down.
O'Connor also has said, however, that some
state action to help minorities might be upheld.
It's not clear under what circumstances.
'Sandra forced my hand'
O'Connor's control over important cases
reflects not only her centrist views, but also her
engaging personal style.
She has kept her close ties with Rehnquist,
plays bridge with Kennedy and Justice Stephen
Breyer and shares an interest in international
legal affairs with those two and Ginsburg.
Though Ginsburg and O'Connor are not
especially close, there is a mutual appreciation.
Ginsburg, who joined the court in 1993, has
called O'Connor "the most helpful big sister
anyone could have."
Justice Brennan, a liberal known for
coaxing his colleagues toward his view, met his
match in the late 1980s, when conservatives
were gaining influence on the court.
"Sandra forced my hand by threatening to
lead the revolution," Brennan wrote to Justice
Thurgood Marshall to explain why he had
compromised with her in one case. A few years
after O'Connor joined the court, Brennan said
that "Sandra fit in so quickly. She ceased
immediately to be 'the first woman justice' and
became just another justice, and a quite fine
one. Moreover, she is delightful."
Now, O'Connor's influence is stronger than
ever. But instead of undermining any agenda of
the left, she more often limits the reach of the
court's right wing, namely Rehnquist, Scalia and
Clarence Thomas.
How long O'Connor will control the center
depends on any new presidential appointments
and O'Connor herself. Despite the grueling
travel, social and athletic schedule she
maintains, rumors persist about her health and
potential retirement. But she gives no indication
of retiring. For now, the court usually does
things her way.
Stephen Strickland of the National Peace
Foundation, who works with O'Connor on the
spring concerts, found her touch with
demanding musicians instructive.
"She charms the socks off those artists,"
Strickland says, referring to one singer-
songwriter in particular. "I remember when she
invited Michael Feinstein to her chambers. He
came out a pussycat."
Copyright 0 2000 Gannett Company, Inc.
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IT'S ALL ABOUT O'CONNOR
Los Angeles Times
Sunday, July 9, 2000
Edward P. Lazarus
According to conventional wisdom, the
current U.S. Supreme Court is highly
unpredictable. It lurches without consistency
from politically liberal decisions, like the ruling
that Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions
violated a woman's right to choose, to
politically conservative ones, like the ruling
striking down the Violence Against Women Act
as an intrusion on state's rights.
This is half-right. The court does lurch
across the political spectrum. But in at least one
important sense, the court is predictable: As
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor votes, so goes the
court.
During the just-completed term, the court
issued full-blown opinions in 74 cases.
O'Connor voted in dissent only four times,
tying the modern record for fewest votes in the
minority. (By contrast, Justice John Paul
Stevens dissented in 27.) O'Connor's feat is all
the more remarkable when one considers the
justices split 5-4 in 21 of the 74 decided cases,
the highest percentage of 5-4 splits in a decade.
Simply put, though the justices are closely
divided on many issues, O'Connor holds the
balance of power and wields it to uncommon
effect.
Yet, these impressive statistics do not fully
capture the enormity of O'Connor's swing-
voting influence. In many of the most fiercely
contested and vital areas of law, she is not
merely one undifferentiated member of a
narrow five-justice majority. Instead, O'Connor
seems to purposefully write separately from the
majority, knowing that, because her vote is
essential to that side, she can bend the court--
and the law--to her will.
Take the issue of abortion. Through
separate writings in 5-4 cases, O'Connor has
forced on the court her test for determining the
legality of restrictions: They are legal unless a
restriction imposes an "undue burden" on a
woman's right to choose. O'Connor, moreover,
is adamant about having her personal view of
what constitutes an "undue burden" prevail at
the court. In the recent partial-birth abortion
case, for example, she wrote separately from
the other four members of the majority to
signal that in her almost surely controlling view
that a more carefully crafted ban would be
constitutional.
O'Connor is similarly in charge in the many
cases defining the constitutionally mandated
separation of church and state. Through
separate concurrences, O'Connor created her
own idiosyncratic test for deciding whether a
challenged state action constitutes an
impermissible establishment of religion. In her
view, the Constitution precludes government-
sponsored activity that appears to "endorse"
religion.
Because of the deep split at the court in
cases involving religion--whether the issue is
school prayer, a holiday display or government
subsidies for sectarian schools--O'Connor's test
holds sway. Indeed, O'Connor worked hard
this term to preserve her pivotal role in the
religion case and already seems to have
positioned herself between the court's rival
factions on the issue of school vouchers, the
next likely landmark challenge in this field.
Ditto in the area of affirmative action. The
court is split 4-4 between those justices
(William H. Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas)
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who would end affirmative action entirely and
those (Stevens, David A. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer) who would
permit it fairly liberally. At the center again,
O'Connor dominated every affirmation-action
case in the last decade with her not-never-but-
almost-never approach. That influence shows
no signs of waning.
All told, it does not seem too much to say
that O'Connor is probably the most powerful
woman in the world. The Supreme Court is
unsurpassed among Western judicial
institutions in the reach of its authority. On the
current court, which shows an eagerness to flex
its muscles, O'Connor not only dictates on
matters of race, religion and the right to
privacy, she is the leading force behind the
court's dramatic revival of the doctrine of
state's rights as a curb on the federal
government.
This concentration of authority is
regrettable. Part of the problem is institutional.
When a court consistently decides its most
important cases by a 5-4 division, it is deeply
unsettling, especially when, as with this
Supreme Court, its rulings frequently strike
down major legislation or overturn long-
standing precedents. So much the worse when
the huge legal issues of the day are controlled
not by five justices, but one.
Of course, this predicament is not entirely
O'Connor's fault. Her position as the swing
vote is dictated significantly by the court's deep
and unbridgeable division and O'Connor's
efforts to moderate the persistent radicalism of
her supposedly more "conservative" brethren.
But identifying the reasons for O'Connor's
influence does not change the damage done
when the Supreme Court is effectively reduced
from a body of nine to a body of one. That
damage is heightened by the highly
personalized nature of O'Connor's
jurisprudence.
What is an "undue burden" on the right to
abortion except what O'Connor says it is? What
is an "endorsement" of religion? Such standards
are either inherently circular or of a purely I-
know-it-when-I-see-it variety. Personalized
judgment has a place in the law and may, at
times, be inescapable, as with such matters as
pornography, which many view as being in the
eye of the beholder. But O'Connor's constant
resort to self-referential formulas when
deciding fundamental issues of civil liberty fuels
the idea corrosive to the rule of law that our
rights are creatures of an individual justice's
personal preferences.
Certainly, the way O'Connor applies her
own standards encourages this view. In her 20
years on the court, O'Connor has consistently
struck down race-based affirmative-action
plans. Yet, in a landmark case, she cast the
decisive vote approving such a plan for women.
Similarly, this term, O'Connor provided the
crucial fifth vote for permitting the Boy Scouts
of America to exclude gays. In the majority
view that O'Connor joined, the Boy Scouts'
right to freedom of association trumped the
right of gays not to be discriminated against.
How is it, then, that a few years before, in a
case raising a nearly identical clash of rights,
O'Connor wrote the majority opinion forcing
the Jaycees to admit women.
Liberals have come to celebrate the role
O'Connor plays, despite her basic conservatism.
As they see it, O'Connor saved Roe vs. Wade
(sort of) and, as far as the left is concerned, is
all that stands between this court and a legal
abyss of Rehnquist's and Scalia's design.
But the cost to the law is great. For lower-
court judges, prospective litigants and the lay
public as a whole, O'Connor's wholesale
dominance of the law is a formula for
uncertainty, confusion and a sickly dependence.
Unfortunately, that is the real legacy of the
court's recently completed term.
Copyright C 2000 Times Mirror Company
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ANTONIN SCALIA: REVOLUTIONARY IN A BLACK ROBE
News & Record (Greensboro, NC)
Sunday, July 2, 2000
David Dubuisson
If Antonin Scalia had his way, the July 4
holiday might be celebrated with armed
takeovers of certain government buildings. In
fact, he would probably applaud if the first
target were the Supreme Court itself. He is the
supreme self-styled "originalist." He thinks the
Constitution should be interpreted in the
context of 1787, when it was drafted.
The context of 1787 was, after all, very
much in the vein of the Declaration of
Independence of 11 years earlier. That
document said, among other things, that
revolution was a God-given right:
That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government.
The Declaration of 1776 spoke of "a long
train of abuses and usurpations" by the British
crown. A survey of Justice Scalia's 14 years on
the Supreme Court would yield an even longer
list of abuses and usurpations that, in his view,
have been committed by the court itself. The
latest indictment is found in Scalia's seething
dissent delivered last Monday as a solid
majority of seven of his colleagues calmly
reaffirmed the landmark Miranda decision.
The latest decision, according to Scalia,
involved the exercise by the court of "an
immense and frightening anti-democratic
power, and it does not exist."
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's reasoning
in declaring the familiar Miranda warnings to be
required by the Constitution was, in Scalia's
word, "preposterous." He said the court
"flagrantly offends fundamental principles of
separation of powers and arrogates to itself
prerogatives reserved to the representatives of
the people."
Wrapping up his screed, Scalia accuses
Rehnquist, his friend and frequent soul mate on
the court, of converting the Miranda "milestone
of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops'
Pyramid ... of judicial arrogance."
Scalia had one co-signer on his dissent,
Justice Clarence Thomas.
This case - Dickerson vs. U.S. - offers
interesting raw material for those who insist
that the Supreme Court be viewed on an
ideological spectrum. In reaffirming Miranda,
the quintessential Warren Court assertion of
criminals' rights, the court fielded a majority
ranging from David Souter (a Republican Bush
appointee) on the left to Rehnquist (the arch-
conservative Nixon appointee) on the right.
And where are Scalia and Thomas? Perhaps not
on the spectrum at all. Unless there is some
uncharted territory to the right of Rehnquist
(Mars?).
I would suggest that they're not on the
liberal-conservative spectrum as such but that
they exist in a sort of parallel universe. It is one
that exists beyond the edge of the political
atmosphere.
Scalia is, by anybody's definition, brilliant.
He is also every inch the law professor, which is
not of itself a bad thing. At their best, law
professors are constantly questioning authority,
challenging intellectual laziness and exposing
the connecting tissue of little fictions that
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enable most of us to live reasonably honest
lives and still sleep at night.
I don't mean to imply that the Supreme
Court is just a game for Scalia, although I don't
know that it isn't. He professes deep loyalty to
certain basic principles, but at the same time his
manner of discourse - both in court and on
paper - suggests someone whose deepest loyalty
is to the sound of his own voice.
The Miranda issue, for example, really
amounts to nothing more than whether the
principles of fairness and government restraint
embodied in the Fifth, Sixth and 14th
amendments can be summarized in the
warnings read to every suspect: the right not to
answer police questions, knowledge that
anything you say can become evidence against
you and the right to the help of a lawyer,
whether or not you can afford to hire one. The
alternative to the standard warning is to have a
trial-within-a-trial in each case examining how
police obtained a statement.
Arguably, either approach would satisfy the
Constitution, but the Supreme Court in 1966
chose the standard warning while Congress in
1968 opted for the full inquiry. Over the next
30 years, the nation has endorsed the court's
approach. Why change it now just to scratch
some obscure academic itch over separation of
powers?
To Scalia, the answer is obvious. The itch
cannot go unscratched. Either the court hews
strictly to the literal text as written, or it is
invading the province of Congress. Although
the court may declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional, it must invoke specific
constitutional language to do so.
While Scalia often is on the losing side,
there's no question that his skillful advocacy has
pushed the rest of the court toward his view.
All the justices have become more scrupulous
about discussing constitutional language during
his tenure. But at the same time his manner and
his tongue almost certainly have lost him a few
rounds.
The irony is that if the other justices should
suddenly be reborn as Scalia disciples and begin
viewing the Constitution through his eyes, the
work of the court would be so much less
challenging, so mechanical, that Scalia himself
would probably be bored to tears with it.
The genius of the Founders was to create a
Constitution capable of constantly adapting to
new challenges through a continuing debate
and intellectual struggle within the Supreme
Court. Scalia, with his rigid and pedantic
approach, is a vital part of that process.
Without the likes of his verbal warfare within
the four walls of the court, the nation might
well be more vulnerable to the kind of violent
overthrow alluded to in the Declaration of
Independence but fortunately no longer
celebrated on Independence Day.
Copyright C 2000 News & Record
(Greensboro, NC)
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THOMAS AND SCALIA: 2 JUSTICES, 2 VIEWPOINTS




Their names, uttered condescendingly in
one breath, may well become a campaign
catchphrase, the latest rallying cry for
Democrats seeking to energize their troops.
"Scalia-Thomas."
If Texas Gov. George W. Bush gets to the
White House, the thinking goes, chances are he
would appoint justices cut from the same cloth
as its two most visible conservatives, Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
Such moves would create an "out-of-
control court" that would "endanger our rights
and freedoms," reversing decades of rulings in
civil rights and liberties, a liberal advocacy
group proclaimed ominously as it kicked off a
"massive national public education campaign."
But those dire predictions, prominent
Supreme Court lawyers and scholars say, are
overblown and present a simplistic view of the
two justices and their environs--and illustrate
how difficult it is to reduce the court to a sound
bite.
The Supreme Court, long a staple of
presidential campaigns, has particular force this
election year. It is widely assumed the next
president will appoint one or two justices to a
court that now decides controversial issues by
one vote--leaving a lasting legacy with sweeping
implications for American life.
Enter "Scalia-Thomas" and the argument,
made most recently by People for the American
Way, that "as a country, we are courting
constitutional disaster."
Those turbo-charged arguments not only
gloss over the process by which the court
works, observers say, but also miss real
differences between the two acknowledged
conservatives. Monday's high-profile decision
in a so-called grandparents' rights case was only
the latest example.
"The idea that Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas are completely out of control and
cutting a swath through civil liberties and civil
rights, with no concern for the individual, is
crazy," said Roy Englert Jr., a frequent advocate
before the Supreme Court who argued a case
over federal court jurisdiction several years ago
in which Scalia and Thomas came down on
opposite sides.
For one thing, the court moves
incrementally. The justices must depend on
earlier rulings when they approach a case and,
while Thomas has shown a willingness to
rethink some areas, they still operate under
agreed-upon constraints, largely leaving their
personal ideologies aside.
More importantly, observers say, viewing
Scalia and Thomas as a single entity is
misleading because the two can and do see
things differently, as the grandparents' rights
case showed.
There, Thomas joined more liberal
colleagues, such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in
finding parents have certain constitutional
rights to raise their children without state
interference. Scalia, however, was in the
minority, writing a dissent in which he said
states should have the final say.
Scalia and Thomas vote together about 80
percent of the time, but other justices--such as
David Souter (chosen by President George
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Bush) and Ginsburg (chosen by President
Clinton)--pair up about as often.
That said, some critics still think of
Thomas, who was appointed by Bush, as the
intellectual understudy of Scalia, appointed by
President Ronald Reagan, even though Thomas
often is boldly independent. After almost a
decade on the court, Thomas' voice is clear and
passionate, and he frequently offers distinct
views on race, religion, free speech and the
structure of government.
"The jurisprudence of both Justices Scalia
and Thomas is more sophisticated and nuanced
than these broad sweeping generalizations
would allow," said John Roberts Jr., a
Washington lawyer who closely follows the
Supreme Court. "It's a gross oversimplification,
and it's misleading and inaccurate, to reflexively
link the two of them together."
They do see eye to eye on several high-
profile issues. They would leave it to the states
to decide whether to legalize abortion, for
instance, and they would end racial preferences
in contracting and school admissions. And as
the court finishes this term by handing down
rulings in an array of contentious cases--from
whether states can ban certain controversial
abortions to whether the Boy Scouts can
exclude gays--they are certain to be together
again.
"From the perspective of the left, they're
the two most dangerous justices, because
they're two young and strong critics of Roe vs.
Wade," said Yale Law School professor Akhil
Amar. "But they don't always agree, and, in 5-4
cases, they have divided. And they're not always
predictable votes for conservatives."
Two weeks ago, Thomas sided with his
more liberal colleagues in two opinions. He
joined the majority to strike down government
restrictions on adult cable television
programming, and he dissented from a ruling
that blocked some lawsuits against automakers
for failing to install air bags.
Scalia took the opposite view.
That the two have their differences should
be obvious, but it often is overlooked. The
recent case on cable television programming,
for instance, isn't the first time they parted ways
on the 1st Amendment. There also was a case
involving Margie McIntyre, an Ohio woman
who wanted to pass out anonymous leaflets
criticizing a local tax levy.
In its report two weeks ago, People for the
American Way said dissents by Scalia and
Thomas on free speech would "allow more
direct government restrictions on political
expression."
They then refer to Scalia's dissent in the
McIntyre case, in which he said the government
could ban her leaflets. That thinking, the
group's report said, would have banned
Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" and other
important political speech.
The report doesn't mention, however, that
Thomas made that point first--when he sided
with McIntyre in the 1995 case and voted to
allow her anonymous leaflets.
Thomas almost always writes for himself in
the civil liberties area, where speech, the press,
religion and criminal justice are at stake,
according to Scott Douglas Gerber in "First
Principles," a recent book on Thomas'
jurisprudence.
Thomas has urged a "dramatic rethinking"
of the court's views in some of those areas,
particularly in calling for greater protection of
commercial speech, Gerber notes.
In the area of civil rights, Thomas has
drawn on his experiences to issue some of his
most eloquent and personal concurring
opinions.
He insists the Constitution is colorblind
and therefore prohibits the government from
treating people differently because of their skin
color. That includes racial-preference programs,
which, he says, stamp minorities "with a badge
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of inferiority," making them dependent on the
system and prompting whites to have either
"attitudes of superiority" or resentment.
In voting rights, as well, Thomas has argued
that drawing legislative districts to elect
minorities has resulted in racial polarization that
destroys "any need for voters or candidates to
build bridges between racial groups."
Thomas and Scalia are what legal experts
call originalists. They believe the Constitution
should be narrowly interpreted as the framers
intended. Under that view, courts should not
intervene to create new rights or strike down
state laws where the Constitution is silent.
"Imaginative efforts to assert constitutional
protections would not be much favored in a
Scalia-Thomas world," said Carter Phillips, a
court advocate.
Unlike Scalia, however, Thomas is more
willing to go beyond the Constitution. He refers
to a "higher law," such as the Declaration of
Independence, which provides that "all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights." On
Monday, in the grandparents' rights case, Scalia
pointedly refused to rely on such a rationale.
Legal observers point to many decisions in
which Thomas and Scalia depart, raising the
question of why they remain so inextricably
linked in the public mind.
Scalia is certainly a dominant force on the
court, a pure intellectual whose quick wit,
theatrical tone and piercing questions at
argument often steal the show.
Thomas is far more reserved on the bench.
Some observers say it may stem from first
impressions. The public met Thomas during
the rancorous Senate confirmation hearings
that aired Anita Hill's sexual harassment
allegations.
"A lot of this is lingering hangover from the
confirmation battle," said attorney Roberts.
"The people who opposed his confirmation are
determined to be proven right, despite what the
record and the evidence shows."
Copyright C 2000 Chicago Tribune Company
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THE LIBERAL REPUBLICAN
ForA Decade, Justice David Souter Has Led a Rear-Guard Attack on
the Rehnquist Court's States' Rights Philosophy. Who Would Have
Dreamed It?
Los Angeles Times
Sunday, July 2, 2000
DavidM. O'Brien
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court ended
another contentious term with the justices
splitting 5-4 roughly a third of the time. It also
marked a decade on the high bench for Justice
David H. Souter, who has emerged as one of
the sharpest critics of the conservative majority
and a leader of the court's liberals.
Souter is rallying dissenters in a relentless
battle against a bare majority, commanded by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, over states
rights and the power of Congress to enact anti-
discrimination and other laws. Invariably,
Justice John Paul Stevens, named by
Republican President Gerald R. Ford, and
President Bill Clinton's two court appointees,
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G.
Breyer, join Souter's dissents.
Make no mistake. With the court so bitterly
divided, the stakes in the coming presidential
election are high for Souter. Depending on who
is elected and fills future vacancies, the balance
on the court is certain to shift. Either Souter's
dissents will become opinions of the court, or
his struggle will drag on for 20 years or more.
Last week, Souter was in the bare majority
that struck down Nebraska's broad ban on
partial-birth abortions, just as he was in
stopping the court from overruling its 1973
Roe vs. Wade decision in Planned Parenthood
vs. Casey in 1992. Writing for the court in
Casey, Souter compared the abortion
controversy to the 1937 constitutional crisis
over the court and to its overruling the doctrine
of separate but equal in education in Brown vs.
Board of Education in 1954. The court
correctly abandoned precedents in those
instances, Souter stressed, but Roe is different
and overturning it would badly damage the
court's prestige and the public's faith in
constitutional principles.
Earlier this term, Souter again led the
charge in blasting the other appointees of
Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George Bush, this time for striking down the
Violence Against Women Act. He attacked
them for limiting congressional power and for
second-guessing the reasonableness of federal
legislation addressing violence against women,
which costs the national economy $ 3 billion
annually.
Similarly, Souter challenged the court's
conservative majority when it invalidated the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1997,
the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1995 and
other laws. In its haste to prop up states' rights,
the majority dismissed the social and economic
consequences of guns in schools. But Souter
countered with a one-two punch, underscoring
the power of Congress to respond to national
problems and its need to combat the effects of
gun violence on the economy.
No one predicted the role Souter now
plays. When Bush nominated him July 23, 1990,
legal analysts predicted he would solidify a
conservative court, instead of carrying on the
tradition of liberal Justice William J. Brennan
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Jr., whose seat he fills and who was also named
by a Republican president, Dwight D.
Eisenhower (who later regretted his selection).
How wrong Souter has proved them.
Labeled the stealth candidate, Souter was a
mystery man, little known outside New
Hampshire. At the urging of Bush's chief of
staff, former New Hampshire Gov. John H.
Sununu, and Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.),
he had been seated on a federal appellate court
three months earlier but had yet to decide a
case. Before that, he spent seven years on the
state supreme court, after serving on a superior
court and as state attorney general.
Nonetheless, Souter offered candid insights
during his two days of confirmation hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Unlike
Judge Robert H. Bork, whose 1987 nomination
was defeated, Souter was congenial, wry and, as
he put it, open-minded: not wedded to a rigid
judicial philosophy but concerned with history
and tradition.
Most revealing, Souter declared that the
Constitution's majestic clauses--the due-process
and equal-protection clauses-are broad and
demand attention to evolving precedents. He
also declined to embrace the hard-line states'
rights position of conservative senators like
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C). So, not surprisingly,
he now fights with the standard-bearers of that
position, Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas.
Actually, Souter's dogged stance should
come as no surprise. It is rooted in his family
heritage of Yankee Republicanism. His great-
great-grandfather played a role in securing
Abraham Lincoln's presidential nomination in
1860. Other relatives worked in the
Underground Railroad, helping escaped slaves
to freedom. Throughout U.S. history, Yankee
Republicans have defended the will of the
nation and championed freedom for all in
standing up to states' rights advocates, who
preached parochialism and often harbored
racism.
Unquestionably, Souter considers himself
engaged in an epic struggle comparable to the
judicial controversy of the 1930s. Then, a
conservative majority of the court struck down
early New Deal legislation. In 1937, Democratic
President Franklin D. Roosevelt retaliated by
proposing to increase the number of justices
from nine to 15, thereby securing a favorable
majority. The court, in turn, backed down with
its switch-in-time-that-saved-nine decisions,
and Roosevelt's court-packing scheme was
defeated.
For more than 50 years after the 1937
constitutional crisis, the court deferred to the
exercise of congressional power in passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and most other laws.
But Rehnquist's bare majority appears bent on
turning back the clock, even drawing into
question the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act.
Repeatedly, Souter skillfully reminds the
court and the country how disastrous--"tragic"
is his word--conservative judicial activism was
in the 1930s and at present. Then and now, he
emphasizes, the court's decisions rest on
nothing more than empty formalistic
distinctions. Back in the 1930s, they were
contrived to preserve the late-1 9th-century
philosophy of laissez-faire economics. Now,
they aim to advance what he considers to be an
intellectually indefensible conception of states'
rights. Like the pre-1937 court, the Rehnquist
court thwarts the operation of the national
democratic process in disregard of our nation's
history and the world economy.
Again, last week, Souter led the dissenters
in fighting the conservative majority's chipping
away at the high wall of separation of church
and state. When the majority overturned two
precedents in upholding direct government aid
to religious schools, Souter passionately
defended principle and displayed a keen
knowledge of history, just as he did when the
court struck down affirmative-action programs
and signaled an end to efforts to achieve
integrated schools.
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Souter's oak-paneled, spartan chamber
offers another clue to his emergence as an
eloquent, scholarly advocate of both federalism
and individual rights. Above the desk where
Souter works--without a computer, unlike other
justices--hangs a portrait of Chief Justice
Harlan F. Stone. Both justices share roots in
New Hampshire and Massachusetts, and Stone
was known as a "New England woodcarver"
for his carefully crafted opinions. Appointed by
Republican President Calvin Coolidge in 1925,
Stone was elevated to chief justice by
Roosevelt, in 1941, because he championed the
court's deference to Congress and its protection
of fundamental rights and minorities.
Souter also frequently cites another
Republican justice, John M. Harlan, who was
appointed by Eisenhower. Harlan was the
grandson and namesake of Justice John
Marshall Harlan (1877-1911), who coined the
phrase "the Constitution is colorblind" in his
dissent in Plessy vs. Ferguson in 1896. The
second Harlan (1955-71) continued Stone's
combination of judicial self-restraint and ardent
defense of individual rights. Like Harlan, Souter
was a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University
before he went to Harvard Law School. His
intellectual kinship with Harlan is evident in his
opinions defending the right of privacy, the
separation of church and state and evolving
standards of due process and equal protection.
Like Stone and Harlan, Souter is a
Republican in the tradition of Lincoln and the
Reconstruction Congress. Remaining true to
principles, with a grand view of history, Souter
wages war with Reagan's and Bush's appointees
over their judicial activism and social
conservatism. Asked about his stance, he might
wryly reply he is a Republican from a
Republican state, who just happens to make a
living writing liberal dissents.
Copyright C 2000 Times Mirror Company
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4TH CIRCUIT JUDGES STEERING TO THE RIGHT
Supreme Court Likes Appeals Panel's Direction but Keeps it Fom
Pushing Too Far, Experts Say
The Washington Post
Wednesday, July 5, 2000
Brooke A. Masters
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th
Circuit has called into question things many
Americans take for granted: congressional
power to help rape victims and protect privacy,
environmentalists' right to sue polluters, and--
most dramatically--the 34-year-old requirement
that police tell criminal suspects they have the
right to remain silent.
Each time, the Richmond-based court,
which oversees Maryland, Virginia and three
other states, sought to move the country to the
right. The decisions were so controversial and
full of national import that the U.S. Supreme
Court took nine 4th Circuit cases this term--up
from four the year before.
Now that the high court session is over,
legal experts say the Supreme Court majority
has sent a clear signal to the appellate court: We
like what you are doing, but sometimes you go
too far. That means the conservative 4th Circuit
majority is unlikely to shift direction, analysts
said.
"The message the high court is sending is
not that the ship is heading in the wrong
direction, but that the engines are going too
fast," said John C. Yoo, a law professor at the
University of California at Berkeley. "They
misjudged how aggressive the Supreme Court
wanted to be."
The high court overwhelmingly rejected the
challenges to Miranda warnings,
environmentalists and a federal law preventing
states from selling driver's license information.
But a 5 to 4 majority upheld the 4th Circuit on
two high-profile cases--one that struck down a
law allowing rape victims to sue their attackers
in federal court and another declaring that the
Food and Drug Administration cannot regulate
tobacco.
In the major death penalty case of the term,
the justices ruled that the appeals court was too
skeptical of prisoners' claims, but it agreed with
the 4th Circuit in two of three other capital
cases.
"They pushed pretty far, and in some cases,
the Supreme Court left them hanging," said
Yale University law professor Akhil R. Amar.
"There was no harm in asking, but the Supreme
Court said no more often than it said yes....
The not-so-subtle message is: We lead, you
follow."
Even so, the 4th Circuit's 55 percent
reversal rate was better than three other circuits
with high-profile cases--the famously liberal 9th
Circuit was reversed in nine of 10 cases.
Overall, the Supreme Court reversed 58 percent
of the 76 cases that came from lower courts.
"The 4th Circuit is right on the mark," said
University of Virginia law professor John C.
Jeffries. "Issues such as federalism are going to
involve a lot of line-drawing. But in concept,
[the Supreme Court] and the 4th Circuit are in
line."
Most of the 4th Circuit judges contacted for
this article declined to comment or did not
return phone calls. But Paul V. Niemeyer, a
Baltimore-based member of the court, said he
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tries not to worry about the circuit's batting
average.
"As you decide cases, you call them as you
see them. And what happens afterward
happens," he said. "I don't think you can
foresee these things while you're writing."
The 4th Circuit's biggest loss came in the
case where the judges took the biggest risk. In
the case of Charles Dickerson, who was
accused of robbing several Washington area
banks, the appeals court focused on an issue
that neither party--nor any law enforcement
agency--had raised. Led by Judge Karen J.
Williams, the court declared that Miranda
warnings were not constitutionally based and
had been overruled by a long-overlooked 1968
law.
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court shot
down the appellate court, 7 to 2. Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, who has praised the 4th
Circuit for its low reversal rate, wrote the
majority opinion. Although the language was
polite, even gentle, the message was clear:
"Miranda announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede . . . [and] we
decline to overrule Miranda ourselves,"
Rehnquist wrote.
The 4th Circuit did better on cases
involving federal power, a hotbed of legal
change. Over the past five years, a five-member
majority of the Supreme Court has sought to
curb federal efforts to regulate and legislate in
new areas, and the 4th Circuit has followed its
lead.
The high court agreed with the 4th Circuit
that the 1994 Violence Against Women Act was
unconstitutional and that Congress had not
given the Food and Drug Administration the
power to regulate tobacco as a drug. But in a
landmark privacy case, the justices voted 9 to 0
that Congress has the power to prevent states
from selling driver's license information.
"The 4th Circuit enables the Supreme Court
to look more moderate on federalism issues,"
said Yale law professor Judith Resnik. "The
Supreme Court majority is working a
substantial revolution, but it is not going quite
as far the 4th Circuit wants to go."
A South Carolina environmental case
demonstrated how the high court recoiled this
year from some of the 4th Circuit's conclusions.
In that case and several others, the lower
court used earlier Supreme Court opinions by
Justice Antonin Scalia to sharply limit the ability
of citizen groups to sue polluters and win civil
penalties. But a 7 to 2 high court reversed that
case in January.
The 4th Circuit "followed Scalia's logic to
its absurd result, and the Supreme Court
slapped them down," said Georgetown
University law professor Richard J. Lazarus.
"What happened is that the justices who had
signed onto what Scalia had written in the
earlier cases didn't buy into the result."
Similarly, the high court found that the 4th
Circuit had gone too far in death penalty cases.
In the case of Terry Williams, who has been
on Virginia's death row for 14 years for killing a
Danville man, the entire court rejected the 4th
Circuit's toughest-in-the-nation standard for
reviewing capital cases. The justices also
unanimously rejected a death penalty ruling in
the case of Virginia inmate Michael Williams.
Yet the Terry Williams opinion makes it
difficult for death row prisoners to get new
hearings, law professors said, and the high
court upheld two other Virginia death
sentences this year.
"The Supreme Court is just a step more
moderate than the 4th Circuit" in death penalty
appeals, said University of Virginia law
professor George A. Rutherglen.
Court observers and several recent opinions
from the 4th Circuit suggest that the judges are
listening to the Supreme Court's criticism.
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After learning that it was 1 to 1 in
federalism cases, the 4th Circuit announced
another major decision last month.
North Carolina officials had argued that the
federal government did not have the power to
ban the hunting of an endangered species--red
wolves--because they were not part of interstate
commerce. That kind of argument had swayed
the Richmond court in two earlier cases. But
this time, the 4th Circuit upheld the federal
regulation.
"It is as threatening to federalism for courts
to erode the historic national role over scarce
resource conservation as it is for Congress to
usurp traditional state prerogatives," Chief
Justice J. Harvie Wilkinson wrote for a 2 to 1
majority.
But that moderation is unlikely to extend to
death penalty cases and others involving
criminal rights, analysts said.
"It's hard to be optimistic," said Stephen
Bright, of the Southern Center for Human
Rights. "There are a lot of judges on the 4th
Circuit who have a clear agenda, and I don't
think the Supreme Court reversing them is
going to slow them down."
Copyright 0 2000 The Washington Post
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HIGH COURT'S UNCOMMON BOND DESPITE CONFLICTS,




WASHINGTON -- On paper, where
opinions give life to law, the Supreme Court's
nine justices can seem like a family that is
constantly bickering. During the term that
ended Wednesday, they accused each other of
hypocrisy, hostility and flat-out stupidity.
Twenty rulings came down to a single vote, the
most 5-4's in nearly a decade.
But a look behind America's most
mysterious branch of government as it
concluded its most consequential term in years
reveals a decorous rhythm, borne of the
familiarity and routines that have developed on
a court that has been together a near-record six
terms. While the secretive court rushed to
produce polarized rulings on abortion, gay
rights and a range of other divisive issues, there
also were parties to attend and rituals to
maintain.
On the day last week that they split 5-4 on a
decision that sent Texas inmate Gary Graham
to his execution, the justices lunched together
in their private dining room and later feasted on
barbecued ribs and fried chicken at a farewell
party for a court official. And even as they
frantically circulated fractious opinions over the
past several weeks, they made speeches
together and joined in a videotaped gag for
Chief Justice William Rehnquist that was
organized by his clerks.
The justices never begin private conference
or take the bench without handshakes all
around. That was the situation on Wednesday,
just before they issued caustic 5-4 opinions that
buttressed abortion rights and dealt a setback to
gay rights.
"No one's not going to go to the sing-along
because of someone else's opinion," said one
justice, referring to the end-of-term party for
the court's clerks that culminates with the chief
justice leading the staff in patriotic song.
Such are the dual orbits of the justices on a
court where members are appointed for life,
virtually all arguments take place on paper and a
grudge gets you nowhere.
"I can think of few times over the years
when a wound continued to draw blood after
an incident between justices," said University of
Chicago law professor Dennis Hutchinson,
who follows the court closely. "When the term
ends, they go to Europe and elsewhere
together, and when they return, they start all
over again. Their loyalty is to the institution."
Each justice an island ...
There is a natural distance among the nine
justices that helps to diffuse personal conflict.
In the vast marble court building, the justices
hole up with their clerks in individually
decorated offices: Arizona's Sandra Day
O'Connor amid Navajo rugs and art from the
Southwest; California's Anthony Kennedy with
paintings reflecting 19th-century realism; New
Hampshire's David Souter beneath New
England landscapes; and New York's Ruth
Bader Ginsburg surrounded by 20th-century
modernist art. Many of the pieces are on loan
from the National Gallery of Art or the
National Museum of American Art.
Some justices and their clerks toiled well into
the night in the last weeks of the 1999-2000
term, scarfing vending-machine snacks or
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calling out for pizza and subs. The clerks for
Stephen Breyer, the justice who wrote the
majority opinion striking down Nebraska's ban
on a mid-term abortion procedure, figured out
how to order Krispy Kreme donuts online.
They also figured out that the sweets are better
when warm.
The justices also kept up their individual
passions: John Paul Stevens, at 80 the court's
oldest member, played tennis; Breyer, 61, kept
biking and O'Connor, 70, dutifully attended her
aerobics class in the court's top-floor gym.
Clarence Thomas, 52, talked up his new
recreational vehicle, practically the size of a
school bus. Rehnquist, 75, kept to the morning
walks that help his bad back.
The conservative chief justice, the longest-
serving member of the current court with 28
years on the bench, also interviewed potential
clerks for the 2001-2002 term, two years away.
That is a sign that Rehnquist, who was
appointed by President Nixon and elevated to
the center seat by President Reagan, won't be
retiring soon.
Some court observers have speculated that
Rehnquist might step down during the next
president's term, along with the liberal Stevens
and possibly O'Connor, who straddles the
center but votes with the liberal wing on some
social issues such as abortion.
... but also part of the main
Each case that comes before the court is first
subject to oral arguments in the white marble
and red velvet courtroom. After one of those
public sessions and then a private vote, the
chief justice (or, if he is in dissent, the most
senior justice in the majority) decides who gets
to write the opinion.
Rehnquist, a big-shouldered man with a
brusque style, has a reputation among his
colleagues for even-handedness. It's the
product of 14 years as a sometimes-frustrated
associate justice on a more liberal Supreme
Court where he lacked seniority.
Around the conference table, no one is
allowed to talk twice until each justice has
spoken once. Usually, every justice gets at least
one majority opinion from each two-week
session of oral arguments.
Tension begins to rise when the justices,
hoping to retain majorities and prevent
defections, start exchanging written drafts of
their opinions.
By this term's end, poker buddies and fellow
conservatives Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia, 64,
were in disagreement on several cases, notably
over the Miranda warnings that police give to
crime suspects and a Colorado law keeping
anti-abortion protesters at least 8 feet away
from people entering clinics.
The chief justice angered Scalia by ruling that
the Miranda requirement could not be
weakened by Congress and by backing the
majority's decision to uphold the Colorado law.
Meanwhile, Breyer and the conservative
Thomas, usually affable seatmates on the
bench, drew back from each other as they read
aloud their conflicting opinions on what
opponents call "partial birth" abortion during
Wednesday's court session. And Kennedy, the
mild-mannered 63-year-old who this term was
on the losing side more than usual, wound up
feeling wronged by most everyone.
The tension built gradually this term.
Majority and dissenting opinions circulated
for weeks, and the justices sometimes took each
other on paragraph-by-paragraph, footnote-by-
footnote.
"Obvious hyperbole!" the bow-tied Stevens
retorted in the tit-for-tat he and Rehnquist
exchanged as the Stevens' majority struck down
prayer at public school football games in a
Texas case.
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Stevens, a Chicago native who now spends
considerable time at his Florida home, is
indicative of the court's shift to the right. The
1975 Ford appointee now is among the court's
most liberal members.
When Rehnquist was in the majority in
upholding the Miranda warnings, Scalia accused
him of playing "word games."
Divisions were unusually sharp at the end of
the term between Rehnquist and Scalia, who
was appointed to the court by Reagan in 1986,
the same year Reagan moved Rehnquist up to
chief. But perhaps symbolic of their enduring
friendship was a scene Tuesday when
Rehnquist turned the baton over to Scalia
during the sing-along. He warned his pal
"Nino," he'd have to give it back.
Work together, stay together
No one on the bench escapes Scalia's
piercing put-downs. He has called his
colleagues' approaches radical, dishonest, even
laughable. However, Scalia's fellow justices
seem to shake it off, chalking it up to an
argumentative nature that was stoked during his
time as a law professor.
Eleven years ago, after saying that
O'Connor's rationale in an abortion case could
"not be taken seriously," the buzz around the
court was that the first woman justice was
fuming. That appears to be history, particularly
because O'Connor often controls the outcome
of close cases.
Approaching two decades on the court,
O'Connor was in the majority this term more
than any other justice. She crafted the
prevailing rationale in many of the key disputes.
On Wednesday, she provided decisive votes
against the Nebraska ban on "partial birth"
abortion and in favor of federal aid to parochial
schools.
Among her regular bridge pals are Kennedy,
who like O'Connor is at the center of the
court's political spectrum, and Breyer, who is
further to the left.
The silver-haired Breyer, whom President
Clinton appointed in 1994 to succeed Harry
Blackmun, held onto O'Connor's vote in
orchestrating the court's rejection of the
Nebraska statute.
Surprisingly, Kennedy, who had provided a
critical vote in a 1992 case in which the court
affirmed abortion rights, sided with the court's
anti-abortion faction this time. He cited the
"moral difference" between the "partial birth"
technique and other methods used for mid-
term abortions.
From the bench, Kennedy expressed a sense
of betrayal at how the abortion ruling he had
supported in 1992 was being cited by the court
to justify allowing the "partial birth" abortion
procedure that he finds reprehensible. He called
the majority's view in the Nebraska case as a
"dispiriting disclosure of the illogic and
illegitimacy of the court's approach."
But that won't stop Kennedy from spending
part of his summer recess with O'Connor,
Breyer and Ginsburg, with whom he also
differed in the Nebraska case. They'll go to
London for a series of American Bar
Association events.
Ginsburg, Clinton's first appointee to the
court, votes consistently on the left and is most
aligned with Souter, the 1990 Bush appointee
whose liberal record indicates that a president
can never be certain how an appointee will rule
once on the bench.
Off the bench, the globetrotting, opera-
loving Ginsburg couldn't be more different
from Souter, a bachelor who likes to eat alone
and, as soon as the term ends, drives back to
his beloved New Hampshire for the summer.
Just weeks before the 1999-2000 term began,
Ginsburg learned she had colon cancer and had
emergency surgery. Although she underwent
63
chemotherapy treatment for the entire term,
she missed no work and kept up her social
schedule.
She and Scalia, her ideological opposite, are
longtime chums. Her prized photos include one
of the pair on an elephant during a mission to
India (Scalia on the front; Ginsburg on the
back) and another of them in white-powdered
wigs and 18th-century costume for their roles
as extras in a Washington Opera performance.
On most decisions, Scalia is closely aligned
with Thomas, a fellow conservative.
In the years immediately after his
appointment in 1991, Thomas was in virtual
lockstep with Scalia. But now, as he approaches
his 10-year anniversary, Thomas has developed
a distinct voice: more conservative than Scalia,
more prone to reverse court precedent and
more apt to rely on legal history predating the
Constitution.
The youngest member of the bench, Thomas
turned 52 last Friday and broke from his
routine for a luncheon party with his clerks at a
Morton's of Chicago steakhouse in
Washington. Much of the talk around the table
was of the new RV Thomas bought for travels
with his wife, Virginia, and Mark, the great-
nephew he adopted. Thomas, a car enthusiast
who last year was grand marshal for the
Daytona 500, keeps a model of the RV in his
chambers.
Thomas is grayer and heavier than the man
millions of Americans saw nine years ago in a
sensational Senate confirmation hearings in
which he was accused of sexual harassment.
Despite the enduring fallout from that ordeal
and the ongoing divisions on the court,
Thomas never misses a chance to declare how
good the relations are among the justices.
"I sit between Justices Ginsburg and Souter
at our conferences," he told an audience in
Oklahoma City recently. "I sit between Justices
Kennedy and Breyer on the bench. You can
add up the times that we agree. Yet, never in
the nine terms has one unkind word been
spoken ... and there have been days when
many of us have been seething about one
opinion or another."
Copyright C 2000 Gannett Company, Inc.
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FIRST MONDAY
When They Hear These Nine Disputes Next Fal, the Justices May Be
Sitting in the Glare of the Electoral Spothght.
Legal Times
Monday, July 10, 2000
Stephenj. Wern2iel
The highly emotional social issues-abortion,
gay tights, and church-state separation-that so
deeply divided the Supreme Court on the final
day of this term are absent so far from the
justices' fall schedule. But the upcoming docket
poses other difficult questions. In particular, the
Court has found some puzzling new problems
involving the limits on congressional power, the
scope of free speech, and the practices of the
police.
For several months to come, the Court will
be making news for reasons other than
jurisprudence. The next term begins Oct. 2, just
five weeks before the presidential election.
Although the justices are unlikely to issue any
major new decisions before Election Day, the
future direction of the Court is already
becoming a campaign issue. The quadrennial
political spotlight may well pause on the 2000-
2001 docket.
Among cases already granted review, some
sound familiar themes for the Court, which will
enter its 15th year of stewardship under Chief
Justice William Rehnquist. Once again, the
justices will debate the Constitution's limits on
the long arm of Washington.
The scope of state sovereign immunity and
the authority of Congress to make states subject
to lawsuits are issues that have deeply divided
the justices in recent years. In University of
Alabama Board of Trustees v. Garrett, No. 99-
1240, the Court will decide whether, in passing
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) in
1990, Congress had the authority under '5 of
the 14th Amendment to abrogate the sovereign
immunity of states under the 11th Amendment.
Back in January, the Court had ruled 5-4
that Congress did not validly waive state
sovereign immumity under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. Less than
two weeks after that ruling (in Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents), the Court agreed to hear
two cases examining state liability under the
ADA. But those cases settled at the urging of
disability rights advocates, who feared a loss in
the high court.
Since the issue of state liability for violating
the rights of disabled people under the ADA
has arisen with some frequency in federal
appeals courts, the justices had no difficulty
finding another vehicle. This case comes from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit,
which reversed a grant of summary judgment
for the University of Alabama.
Constitutional limits on the power of both
Congress and the executive branch are at issue
in Browner v. American Trucking Associations,
No. 99-1257. The case involves the important,
but rarely cited, nondelegation principle that
Congress cannot confer its own legislative
authority on executive agencies. The D.C.
Circuit ruled that the Environmental Protection
Agency improperly exercised legislative power
when it adopted tough new regulations for
ozone and soot under the Clean Air Act. The
court said that the EPA's interpretation of its
authority under the act was so broad that it was
as if Congress had delegated its lawmaking
function. The case is generating enormous
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interest because it could scale back the entire
federal regulatory system.
Even if the case were only an
environmental dispute, the issues would be of
great importance to industry, which is seeking
eased air quality standards, and
environmentalists, who are concerned that
pollution levels will be allowed to rise. Indeed,
the high court raised the environmental stakes
by later agreeing to hear the related appeal of
American Trucking Associations v. Browner,
No. 99-1426, which addresses the role of cost-
benefit analysis in setting Clean Air Act
standards. The Court will hear arguments that
the EPA has considered only the benefits to
public health, not the costs of implementation.
In yet another regulatory dispute, the Court
will look once again at the reach of the federal
power to regulate interstate commerce. The
issue comes up in an unusual setting-an
assertion by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
that it has jurisdiction over a proposed landfill
outside Chicago. The site, where some local
communities want to dump solid waste,
contains inland waters that have become home
to migratory birds. The 7th Circuit ruled that
the Clean Water Act gives the Corps authority
over intrastate waters where migratory birds are
present and that this is a proper exercise of
Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce. The case is Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of
Engineers, No. 99-1178.
YOU TALKIN' TO ME?
In another area of ongoing concern, the
applications of federal and state statutes raise
significant First Amendment issues for the
Court next term.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 99-1687, and
United States v. Vopper, No. 99- 1728, the
justices face the question of whether individuals
can be sued for damages for revealing the
contents of telephone calls that were illegally
overheard and recorded by other individuals.
The 3rd Circuit ruled that federal and
Pennsylvania wiretapping laws violate the free
speech guarantee of the First Amendment
when used to impose liability on people who
did not themselves illegally intercept phone
conversations.
The case is of particular importance to the
news media, which sometimes receive and
disseminate information that may have been
obtained by third parties through questionable
means. The 3rd Circuit relied on a line of
Supreme Court decisions refusing to punish the
publication of truthful material that was not
illegally obtained by the publisher. But the D.C.
Circuit reached the opposite result in a similar
case. Now the Supreme Court will try to
resolve the conflict.
The high court will also decide whether
Congress may prohibit the use of Legal Services
Corp. funds to try to change existing welfare
rules. The 2nd Circuit held that Congress
violated the First Amendment in 1996 when it
barred LSC lawyers from taking on welfare
clients to challenge welfare rules. The court said
that this provision-which was part of a larger
set of restrictions, most of which were upheld-
was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
because it singled out those who argued against
the status quo. The related cases are LSC v.
Velazquez, No. 99-603, and United States v.
Velazquez, No. 99-960.
Another case with First Amendment
implications plunges the Court into the political
thicket and indirectly back into the debate over
term limits. In Cook v. Gralike, No. 99-929, the
justices will examine a voter-initiated
amendment to the Missouri Constitution that
required the state's congressional delegation to
either support a term-limits amendment to the
U.S. Constitution or be labeled on future
ballots as having "disregarded voters'
instruction on term limits." The 8th Circuit
ruled that the Missouri amendment violated the
First Amendment, as well as the Article I
protection for legislative "speech and debate"
and other provisions.
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On the criminal side of the docket, the Newspapers Group Inc.
justices also have a number of interesting
disputes. Once again, the spotlight is on the
Fourth Amendment.
In Indianapolis v. Edmond, No. 99-1030,
the Court will look at police roadblocks on city
streets. The 7th Circuit suggested that such
roadblocks might be valid if justified to
promote traffic and highway safety. But
Indianapolis used the roadblocks to try to find
evidence of criminal drug use. Because it was
not based on any individualized suspicion, this
practice violated the Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable search and
seizure, said the 7th Circuit.
In Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 99-936, the
high court will step into the emotional debate
over prosecuting pregnant women who use
drugs or engage in other practices that might
endanger their babies. The Court will review
the practice at a Charleston public hospital of
testing pregnant patients suspected of cocaine
use and then turning the results over to police if
the test comes back positive. The 4th Circuit
upheld the practice, finding the tests justified
under the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the Court will decide, in Atwater v.
Lago Vista, Texas, No. 99- 1408, whether the
Fourth Amendment limits police authority to
arrest people and take them into custody for
offenses that are punishable only by fines. In
this case, the person was arrested for failure to
wear a seat belt. The 5th Circuit found that the
arrest was not an unreasonable seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.
That's nine interesting cases to begin
observing the 2000-2001 term. The justices
have actually granted review in some 34 cases
so far. As they add more, possibly during the
summer, or more likely in September, the
political process will surely be ratcheting up its
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.
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